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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 58 NOVEMBER 1972 NUMBER 8
REFLECTIONS ON THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
PRELUDE TO REFORM
Michael 1. Graetz*
[T]o tax and to please, no more than to love and be 'wise, is not
given to men.
Edmund Burke in a speech on
American Taxation, 1774**
T AX reform is one of those motherhood issues-everybody's for it.
Election year 1972 generated many far-reaching tax reform pro-
posals which, if enacted, would have a profound impact on virtually
every segment of American society. Senator McGovern recommended
taxing capital gains at the same rates as ordinary income,' eliminating
almost $7 billion granted to businesses by reducing the investment tax
credit and depreciation allowances, 2 and offering state and local govern-
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.B.A., 1966, Emory University;
LL.B., 1969, University of Virginia; Staff of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
Department of the Treasury, 1969-1972.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Arthur G. Potts, student at the
University of Virginia Law School, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of
this Article. The author would also like to thank F. David Lake of Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering, Washington, D.C, and Theodore A. Kurz of Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons
& Gates, New York City, former colleagues in the Treasury Department for their
thoughts and comments during the formulation of this Article.
** SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDMUND BuRKE 96 (W. J. Bates ed, 1960).
1 Address by Senator George McGovern before the New York Society of Security
Analysts, Aug. 29, 1972, reported in Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
In general, under present law, capital gains income of individuals is taxed at one-half
the rates applicable to ordinary income with a maximum 25 percent rate applicable to
the first $50,C00 of capital gains. Corporations' capital gains are taxed at a maximum 30
percent rate while ordinary income is generally taxed at a rate of 48 percent. Senator
McGovern's proposal to tax capital gains at the same rates as ordinary income would
have been phased in over a two or three year period. In connection with the increase in
capital gains tax, he proposed a reduction in the maximum individual income tax rate
from 70 percent to 48 percent.
2 1d. at col. 4. Senator McGovern estimated that $4.2 billion would be produced
through reductions in depreciation allowances and $2.5 billion by changing the invest-
ment credit provisions.
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ments a 50 percent interest subsidy to encourage them to issue taxable,
rather than tax-exempt, bonds.3 In addition, he proposed eliminating the
percentage depletion allowance and the deduction for intangible drilling
expenses-two provisions which currently diminish the taxes on income
from the production of oil, gas, and other natural resources.4 And, even
though President Nixon did not detail any tax reform proposals during
the campaign, he did pledge to attempt to reduce state and local prop-
erty taxes.5 Thus, tax reform, a much discussed topic in the past months,
seems certain to become a subject of concern for the 1973 Congress.
In spite of the myriad nature of the proposals, a consensus on goals of
tax reform is fairly easily obtained. President Nixon, Senator McGovern,
and Congressman Wilbur Mills all agree that reform should simplify the
tax laws, produce greater equity in taxation, and promote economic
growth.6 Concurrence on means, however, is a different matter; those
81d. Under the McGovern proposal, local governments could, at their option, issue
taxable bonds and receive a federal subsidy of 50 percent of the interest cost.
1ld. at 3. McGovern proposed that the present system of percentage depletion
which allows deductions in excess of actual costs incurred should be abolished. In addi-
tion, he proposed that intangible drilling development and exploration costs should be
required to be capitalized where producing properties result from the outlays. Summary
of Senator McGovern's Proposals for Federal Tax Reform, on file at the Virginia Law
Review [hereinafter cited as Summary of Senator McGovern's Proposals).
5 In his Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, Aug. 23, 1972,
President Nixon stated that the goal of his Administration would be to reduce the prop-
erty tax which he called "an unfair and heavy burden on the poor, the elderly, the wage
earner, the farmer and those on fixed incomes." The President's Remarks Accepting
the Nomination, August 23, 1972, in 8 WEEKLY CompiLATioN oF PREsimEnA. DocurvmEN-rs
1265 (Aug. 28, 1972). In his State of the Union Address on Jan. 24, 1972, President Nixon
spoke of property taxes in a similar fashion, describing them as the "most oppressive and
discriminatory of all taxes.' The State of the Union Address, January 20, 1972, in
8 WEruY COMPILMATON OF PREsmmsiAL DocUmENrs 71 (Jan. 24, 1972). See also Fowlkes,
Administration Leans to Value-Added Tax to Help Solve National Fiscal Crisis,
4 NATL J. 210 (Feb. 5, 1972). Many other tax reform ideas are circulating in Congress and
elsewhere. See, e.g, S. 3378, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 11862, 92d Cong, 2d Sess.
(1971). For a full discussion of H.R. 11863, see 117 CoNG. Rxc. H. 12,865 (daily ed.
Nov. 19, 1971). More recent indications suggest that the President and Congressman
Mills may no longer wish to press for tax reform in the next Session. See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
OCongressman Wilbur Mills stated in an interview:
[Tax reform means more to me than establishment of equity, as important as
that is. Simplicity is a great goal of reform.
U.S. NEws & Wou.D REPoRT, May 26, 1969, at 43.
In the summary of his tax reform proposals, Senator McGovern stated that a "fair,
efficient and evenhanded tax system is a basic demand and urgent need of every Ameri-
can" and criticized the "inequities" and "mass of complexities" that "riddle" our present
tax system. Summary of Senator McGovern's Proposals, supra note 4.
In his 1969 tax reform message, President Nixon stated, "We must reform our tax
1390
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three are far less likely to agree on specific tax reform measures. Political
and philosophical biases only partly explain disagreements over the
merits of particular proposals. Perhaps more important is the complexity
of the task. Economic debate of alternative tax measures inevitably
brings to mind Paul Douglas' remark that one could lay all the econo-
mists end to end around the world and they would never reach a con-
clusion.7 Moreover, attempts to improve the equity of the federal tax
system often directly collide with efforts to simplify it.8 Within Con-
gress, decision-makers tire of responses of "on the one hand.., but on
the other hand" and search constantly for a one-handed lawyer.
The Congressman's dilemma is well illustrated by Under Secretary
of the Treasury Edwin S. Cohen's recent testimony on the proper tax
treatment of married couples and single persons. Congress had been
deluged from both sides-mail from angry unmarried taxpayers protest-
ing that their tax rates were too high relative to married couples with the
same amount of income9 accompanied by complaints of married couples
that the tax system penalized marriage if both spouses had income and
structure to make it more equitable and efficient; we must redirect our tax policy to
make it more conducive to stable economic growth and responsive to urgent social
needs:' HousE Comm. oN WAYs ANo MEAms, 91sr CONG., 2d SEss, TAx REFoRMvr Pao-
PosAL.s 4 (Comm. Print 1969).
7 For example, economists disagree vehemently on the impetus to economic growth
provided by tax incentives such as additional depreciation allowances and the investment
tax credit designed to encourage business purchases. The estimates varied on the feed-
back effect of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system, adopted in 1971. Some
experts feel that there will be no revenue feedback. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. oF THE TREAs-
uxy, AssEr DREctATION RANGE (ADR) SYsTEM 40, n.85 (July, 1971). [hereinafter cited
as ADR PAMPHLrE]. But one economist has calculated that the revenue feedback will be
sufficient to ensure that the ultimate effect of the ADR system will be a net revenue gain
by 1973, which will grow to about $2 billion in 1974. Id. at 40, n.86.
8 See, e.g., Cohen, A New Decade for Taxes and the Search for Simplification, 4
Ihm. LEGAL FoRUM 19 (1970); Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The
Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAw & CoNTsMP. PROB. 673 (1969);
Surrey & Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy, 9 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 915 (1968).
It has been suggested, however, that the added complexity created by attempts to
produce greater equity may yield costs for the many which are greater than the cost
of inequity for a few. The question to be raised is, "[Wlhether, in trading further
complexity for equity, we lose not only simplicity but also equity." New York Com-
mission on Tax Policy, A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAx L. REv.
325, 334 (1972).
9 See generally Hearings on Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons
Where Both Spouses Are Working, Before the House Conmm. on Ways and Means, 92d
Cong, 2d Sess. 73-74 (1972) (testimony of Edwin S. Cohen) [hereinafter cited as
Married Single Hearings].
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thereby created an incentive to "live together in sin."' x Confronted with
the unhappiness of both single and married constituents and uncertain
of the proper resolution of the fundamental issue of taxation of different
types of family units, the House Ways and Means Committee called
public hearings in May, 1972. Imagine the committee members' dis-
comfort when the Treasury testified as follows:
Tax laws cannot be written which will apply to a nation of 200
million persons and provide precise equity in all cases. [W]e cannot
devise rules which demand varying tax burdens depending upon the
type of household in which a single person lives. Unfortunately we
cannot devise rules which will equitably apply the competing prin-
ciples underlying our tax system to every conceivable set of circum-
stances.
Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me for indulging briefly in a
mathematical analysis, I think this problem may be well illustrated
if you consider four cases that illustrate the nature of the problem
and show the impossibility of a solution for all of them.
Case I is a single person who earns $20,000.
Case 2, two single persons each earn $10,000.
Case 3, a husband earns $20,000 and a wife earns zero..
Case 4, a husband and wife each earn $10,000.
If we want no penalty on remaining single-and a large group insists
upon this-Case 1 must pay 'the same tax as Case 3. A single person
earning $20,000 pays the same as a married couple earning $20,000.
If we want no penalty on marrying, Case 2 must pay the same tax
as Case 4. Two single persons earning $10,000 each pay the same tax
as a married couple each earning $10,000.
If we want husband and wife to pay the same tax however they
contribute to the family earnings, Case 3 pays the same tax as Case 4.
To summarize the tax results:
Case 1 equals Case 3.
Case 2 equals Case 4.
Case 3 equals Case 4.
Based on the fundamental mathematical principle that things equal to
the same thing must be equal to each other, the result should then be
that Case 1 equals Case 2, or, in other words, that the tax on a single
person earning $20,000 equals the tax on two single persons each
earning $10,000.
But that cannot be so if we are going to have a progressive income
tax structure, and progressive taxation is a basic tenet of our income
10 Id. at 74.
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tax system. The tax on a single person earning $20,000--Case 1-must
be greater than the total tax on two single persons each earning $10,000
if we are to have a progressive rate structure.
I hope you will forgive me for this mathematical presentation, but
it becomes apparent from this analysis that you cannot have each of
these principles operating simultaneously, and that there is no one
principle of equity that covers all of these cases. No algebraic equa-
tion, no matter how sophisticated, can solve this dilemma. Both ends
of a seesaw cannot be up at the same time. Any rule that is selected
will, in some cases, appear to penalize married couples and, in other
cases seem to penalize single persons. All that we can hope for is a
reasonable compromise."
To no one's surprise, the committee postponed consideration of this
issue until 1973. But this lapse of time will render the "right" answer
no less elusive.
The difficulty of Congress' task in undertaking major reform efforts
in 1973 will be compounded by the pressing governmental need for
revenues. Although President Nixon has repeatedly emphasized that he
will attempt to keep expenditures under control and thereby escape the
need to increase taxes, many feel that this effort is doomed to failure.
It is difficult to predict the ultimate resolution of this battle between less
spending and more taxes. Only one substantial tax increase has been en-
acted in peacetime in the past thirty-five years.12 But the federal deficit
has been large in recent years. Despite an upswing in the economy which
has produced an increase in tax revenues, the deficit for this fiscal
year is expected to total $25 billion. s Many economists have asserted
that even if no new spending programs are enacted, a tax increase
will be necessary.14 Both Chairman Wilbur Mills 5 and Congressman
Byrnes,'" the ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee,
" Id. at 78-79.
12 See R. BLOUGH, THE FEDERAL TAXING PaocEss 238-65 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
R. BLOuG-r]; J. P ECHmAN, FEDERAL TAX Pot cm 257 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
J. PECHMAN].
'
8 See H.R. REP. No. 92-1456, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972). The deficit totals $32
billion if estimated on a Federal funds basis. Id. Deficits of this magnitude cause serious
inflationary pressures. As the House Report observed, "If the Federal government is
not able to reduce its stimulus to the economy during a period of economic improve-
ment it is likely that inflationary pressures will be renewed." Id.
14See, e.g., G. Scmmirzr, E. FarE, A. RmrvN, N. TEEsRS, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORI-
TIEs, Tm 1973 BtmGEr.411-20 (1972).
15 See Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
l6 See Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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agree that a tax increase seems inevitable. Some, including Senator
McGovern, have suggested that needed revenues can be obtained
through tax reform17 while others, among them Chairman Mills, doubt
that tax reform will produce any net increase in the federal revenues. 8
Certainly the history of tax reform legislation supports the latter view. 9
In any case, the need for additional revenues will undoubtedly affect tax
reform decisions. Reforms that exact a substantial revenue cost for im-
proving the equity of the tax system will be less likely to be adopted,
and revenue raising reforms may be phased in more rapidly than in the
past.
The task of tax reform, an extremely difficult undertaking at any
time, may be made immensely more difficult both in economic and
political terms when the government has a pressing need for additional
revenues. It is precisely because the job will be so difficult that the pro-
cess for producing new legislation must be as finely-tuned as possible.
Although the spotlight has been intensively focused on the substantive
issues of tax reform, the mechanics and procedural aspects have been
little illuminated. And, at the very time that the substance of our law
appears about to undergo a searching reexamination, fundamental ques-
tions have been raised about the functioning of the process for enacting
tax legislation. A New York Times editorial described the last major tax
legislation, the Revenue Act of 1971, in the following terms:
By any reasonable standard of responsible legislating, Congress has
put on a classic demonstration of how not to write a major bill. Deci-
sions have been secret, arbitrary, unexplained. A few men have wielded
enormous power and have been accountable to no one [and] the Con-
gressional leadership was always prepared to abdicate its constitutional
responsibilities in writing tax legislation rather than risk a showdown
with the President.20
17See Address by Senator McGovern, supra note 1. McGovern estimated that his
tax reform proposals would raise $22 billion [by 1975]. He stated:
Together, the tax justice and military cutbacks I have proposed would approxi-
mate $54 billion. The total cost of additions to the national budget by a Demo-
cratic Administration would be less than that.
Id. at 4.
18 Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1972, at 22, col. 5.
19 The tax reform and relief provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 were
estimated to produce an annual long-run revenue loss of more than $2.5 billion. STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL 'EVENUE TAxATiON, 91ST CONG., 21 SEss. GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1969. 13 (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited
as GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TiE TAX RuoRm Acri. -
20 N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, at 46, col. 1.
[Vol. 58:13891394
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Equally vociferous criticism has emanated from other sources. Con-
servative syndicated columnist David Lawrence considered the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 to be "a significant example of how the Congress
of the United States struggles with a most complicated piece of legisla-
tion-tax reform-and fails to operate efficiently in its lawmaking func-
tion."'" The liberal press agreed; Joseph Kraft made the following
comment during the debate over the 1969 Tax Reform Act:
It is now clear that taxes are too complicated and sensitive a matter to
be decided in detail by the Congress. . . . The Congress, in fiscal
matters, is a dinosaur-huge body and tiny brain.22
These are serious indictments of the process for enacting tax legisla-
tion, challenges demanding a reappraisal of tax reform procedures. This
Article is intended to help fuel the careful study of the mechanics of tax
legislation that is an essential prelude to any major tax reform effort in
the months ahead.
THE PROCESS FOR ENACTING TAX LEGISLATION
The Constitution grants Congress the power "To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" 23 and further provides, "All Bills
for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. ' 24
Congressional power over tax legislation is constitutionally limited only
by the President's power to veto legislation which can, of course, be
over-ridden by a two-thirds vote of each house. Yet, despite the em-
phasis in the constitutional framework on legislative responsibility, most
tax legislation is enacted as a response to recommendations of the Presi-
dent.25
2 1 Lawrence, Politics Dominate Tax Reform Scene, The Evening Star (Washington,
D.C.), Dec. 11, 1969.
22 Kraft, Po'wer to Destroy, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1969, at C7, col. 1.
23 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
24 U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 7. The House of Representatives, through its traditionally
guarded prerogative to initiate all revenue legislation, will be first to consider, and thus
first to shape, any major tax bill. The Senate, however, will exercise its power to amend
to add new provisions to the tax bill passed by the House.
25 The Revenue Acts of 1964 and 1971 are good examples. Suggestions for new tax
provisions emanate from every department of the Executive Branch: the Department
of Housing and Urban Development suggests new tax incentives for investments in
low and moderate income housing; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
wants tax credits for the cost of tuition at private schools; the Council of Environmental
Quality wants to provide tax benefits for the preservation of, historic buildings, or tax
1972] 1395
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Congressional consideration of a major or controversial tax proposal
typically begins with a public hearing held by the House Committee
on Ways and Means.26 If the Administration initiates the measure, the
Secretary of the Treasury is generally the first witness to appear, fol-
lowed by other Administration spokesmen and then by witnesses from
the general public. At the conclusion of these public hearings the Ways
and Means Committee generally holds executive sessions on the propo-
sals. The public is excluded from these deliberations, but Treasury rep-
resentatives, the committee's staff, and the Staff of the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation2? are normally present to state their views,
respond to questions and supply data and analyses. The House Legisla-
tive Counsel, assisted by the staffs of the Treasury and the Joint Com-
mittee on Internal Revenue Taxation, translate the committee decisions
penalties for using lead in gasoline; the Labor Department is interested in the tax treat-
ment of pensions and other employee benefits. Tax proposals involving fiscal policy
often originate with the President himself or with his'advisors in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, in the Domestic Council, the Treasury, or in the Council of Economic
Advisors. Under the guidance of the President, responsibility for tax policy and tax
administration is vested in the Department of the Treasury. Although administration of
the tax laws is generally delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, responsibility for the formulation of tax policy is retained in the
)ffice of ihe Secretary and assigned to the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, or to the
Under Secretary. The Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy oversees a staff of twenty
lawyers ana thirty-five economists, statisticians and econometricians which is actively
engaged in the development of tax policy and legislation for the Administration. In this
process of development, the staff consults with and relies on many other persons in the
Treasury Department and elsewhere in the Administration. The staff frequently gathers
information from the Internal Revenue Service, the Council of Economic Advisers,
the Office of Management and Budget, the Domestic Council, the International Council
and the Federal Reserve Board. The President, of course, retains final authority over
fiscal policy within the Administration and generally sends messages to Congress on
any Administration proposals for major changes in the tax law.
2 6Established in 1789, the Ways and Means Committee is one of the oldest and
most eminent of the House Committees. It exercises jurisdiction over legislation con-
cerning taxes, tariffs, revenue sharing, foreign trade policy, welfare and health insurance,
the level of the public debt, and the social security system. In the last Congress more
than 2000 bills introduced were referred to the Ways and Means Committee. The com-
mittee is composed of twenty-five members, fifteen of whom are chosen from the party
having a majority of the membership in the House and ten of whom are from the
party in the minority. Because of the extensive commitments of the Ways and Means
Committee, its members generally do not serve on other House committees.
27The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation was established in 1926 pri-
marily to make a techhical tax staff available to both the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Meeting only three times a year on the
average, the committee has certain specific functions relating to overseeing the adminis-
tration of the tax laws. Its primary importance is to provide status for its professional
staff, composed of lawyers, economists, accountants and statistical analysts.
1396
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into statutory language and the Joint Committee staff then prepares a
report describing the bill and outlining reasons for the Ways and Means
Committee's action. The bill and committee report next go to the House
for limited debate. Tax bills are generally sent to the House floor under
a "closed" rule under which no amendments other than those offered by
the committee are generally permitted.2s After House approval the
process is repeated in the Senate.
The hearings of the Senate Finance Committee may produce even
more witnesses and protests than the previous House hearings. House
passage of the bill generally heightens public awareness of the issues,
and the Senate hearings represent the last opportunity for public pre-
sentation of views. Unlike the House procedure, the Senate rules provide
for unlimited debate when a tax bill is considered on the floor, and gen-
erally permit any Senator to move to delete or modify any part of the
bill or to add new provisions.
When the bill passed by the Senate differs from the House version,
the revised bill is returned for House consideration. Though the House
may accept the changes made by the Senate, it ordinarily will ask for
a conference to reconcile the differences. The conferees meet in private,
generally with the assistance of Treasury and the congressional staff. The
House members and Senate members each vote on the issues as a unit,
the vote of each block being controlled by a majority vote of that side.
Once agreement has been reached, a conference report is issued con-
taining the statutory changes and, briefly explaining the conference
result. The report is presented separately to the Senate and House of
Representatives. Each must either accept or reject the conference ver-
sion; no amendments are allowed. If approved by both bodies, the bill
is sent to the President for his signature or veto."
28 The usual procedure for consideration of tax bills is for the House Rules Com-
mittee, at the request of the Ways and Means Committee, to recommend the closed
rule to the entire House with a provision for a specified period of debate on the floor.
The time allotted is divided evenly between the parties. Each side has a manager,
usually the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and the ranking member of the
minority respectively, who controls the time allotments for persons desiring to speak
on the matter. After the alloted time for debate of the measure has expired, opponents
can move to recommit the bill to the Ways and Means Committee with instructions to
report it back to the House with specified amendments. This motion permits opponents
of the measure to record their position and get a test vote on the entire bill. If the
opponents prevail on the motion to recommit, the effect is to amend the bill in accordance
with the provisions of the motion. If it fails, the Ways and Means bill remains un-
changed. See generally R. BLOUGH, supra note 12, at 76-78.
20 Minor tax bills often follow the same procedure. In some cases, however, no public
13971972]
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Relationship Between the Congress and the President
The President's power of persuasion has been a far more effective
influence on tax legislation than his veto power; since 1948 the President
has signed every major tax bill passed by Congress.3" President Nixon
threatened to veto the Tax Reform Act of 1969 after it was passed by
the Senate because he considered the revenue loss from the bill excessive
and inflationary.3 Although this threat did have some impact in shaping
the compromises reached by the conference committee, the President
ultimately signed a bill containing overall tax reductions that he did not
particularly like.32
The President's power to propose legislation and persuade the Con-
gress to adopt it has had more effect. The public now expects the Presi-
dent to provide leadership on all issues of national policy, particularly
on fiscal matters. The President announces his planning and recom-
mendations for fiscal policy in his annual budget messages and economic
reports. If the economy is sluggish, the deficit too great, or if the cost of
living rises steeply, the President receives the blame. If his proposals do
not pass Congress, we feel that the test of leadership has not been met.
At the same time, the public has become increasingly critical of con-
gressional delay or inaction on presidential initiatives for short-term fiscal
hearings are conducted and a conference is unnecessary since the Senate will accept
the House bill or the House will accept the Senate amendments. The procedures
for enacting relatively minor bills have been criticized recently by certain members of
the House of Representatives. See Woodworth, The Federal Tax Legislative Process 25
NAT'L TAx J. 405, 409 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Woodworth]. For a more detailed
description of the tax legislative process, see J. PECnMAN, supra- note 12, at 32. See also
Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted,
70 HARv. L. Rav. 1145 (1957); Address by Edwin S. Cohen before the Tax Section of
the American Bar Association, London, England, July 15, 1971, on file at the Virginia
Law Review.
3OPresident Roosevelt vetoed the Revenue Act of 1943, and President Truman
vetoed the Revenue Act of 1948. Both bills were subsequently passed by Congress over
the presidential veto.
31 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1969, at 54, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 10,
1969, at 22, col. 1.
32Statement by the President Upon Signing the Tax Reform Act of 1969 into Law,
December 30, 1969, in 6 Wmxry CoMauAmioN or PaEsmENTAL DocuMENTs 7 (Jan. 5,
1970). The President stated:
Eight months ago, I submitted a sweeping set of proposals to Congress for the first
major tax reform in 15 years, one which would make our tax system more fair.
My proposals were carefully balanced to avoid increasing the pressure on prices
that were already rising too fast.
Congress has passed an unbalanced bill that is both good and bad. The tax reforms,
on the whole, are good; the effect on the budget and on the cost of living is bad.
1398
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policy.3 3 The need for prompt action, coupled with the prevailing view
of presidential responsibility, has produced numerous recommendations
that Congress delegate the President limited authority to raise or lower
taxes within a certain range.3 4 Critics of the process, such as McGeorge
Bundy, typically turn to such proposals:
Flexible tax rates are now quite simply indispensable to the effective
management of economic policy. . . . The Congress is too big and
slow and varied to exercise this power on its own.... In tax policy
the Executive branch is not much too strong, as the disbelievers in
modem government tell us, but much too weak.35
33The parliamentary system of government in Canada is structured so as to guaran-
tee that the government's tax proposals are enacted without significant modification.
The efficiency of this system, which keeps a tax measure secret until it is announced
in the Budget, has greatly impressed American economists. In Walter Heller's words,
"[T]he flexibility, speed and selectivity of the Canadian action in 1966 made the US.
political economists mouth water." W. HELLa_, NEw DiMFNsioNs OF POLriTcAL EcoN-
oMy 104 (1967), quoted in Note, Tax Adjustments for Economic Stability and Growtb:
Proposals for Reform of the Legislative Process, 5 HAnv. J. LEcis. 267 (1968).
Consider the following remarks of Patrick Jenkin, Financial Secretary to the Treasury
of the United Kingdom:
Whereas the separation of powers is still a reality in the United States, the
British Constitution has changed out of all recognition. Today, the separation
between Executive and Legislature is now hard to discern. The Executive, in the
PerSons of the Prime Minister and his Government, so far from being excluded
from the Legislature, are Members of Parliament and indeed lead and direct its
business. In turn, they depend for their continuance in office upon their being
able to command a majority in the House of Commons. If they fail to command
a majority, then the Government must resign, and a General Election may ensue.
[This general constitutional position] applies, of course, in all fields of pol-
icy, but it is of particular significance in the field of fiscal policy. This is so for
the very good reason that the right to raise revenue lies at the heart of Govern-
ment; financial legislation is almost by definition a matter of confidence, i.e, a
matter on which the continuance of the Government in office depends. The Gov-
ernment, if it is to remain in office, must be sure of its ability to carry its main
fiscal proposals into legislation: it must be able to rely on its majority in the House
of Commons to secure this.
Address by Patrick Jenkin before the Tax Section of the American Bar Association,
London, England, July 15, 1971, on file at Virginia Law Review.
Thus, there are three major features of a parliamentary system which differ from the
American system. Ministers sit in the legislature, and because they represent the majority
party, their proposals are usually certain to become law. Second, Parliament's role as an
initiator of policy is strictly limited. And third, the defeat of a major proposal put
forward by the Government could precipitate the Government's resignation and perhaps
an immediate general election.
34 For a more complete discussion of these proposals, see Note, Tax Adjusiments for
Economic Stabilization and Growth: Proposals for Reform of the Legislative Process,
5 HARv. J. LEGis. 267, 271-289 (1968).
85 McGeorge Bundy in the Godkin Lectures of 1968, quoted in Kraft, Power to
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But the Congress has steadfastly refused to give serious consideration to
such a measure, and even the proposals for delegation of some congres-
sional taxing authority to the President have been limited to measures
designed to facilitate short term fiscal policy.3" No one has advocated
delegation of authority to determine basic tax reform issues. To suggest
that the Congress grant the President its power over basic tax reform
issues would be to suggest that our democratic system be replaced by a
parliamentary or more authoritarian form of government.37
Rather than delegating power to the President in tax matters, Con-
gress has been attempting to increase its own power by demanding
presidential proposals for tax reform. The Revenue and Expenditure
Control Act of 1968 contained a provision requiring the President to
present his recommendations for tax reform to the Congress by Decem-
ber 31, 1968.38 And, during the recent Senate debate over revenue shar-
ing, Senator Kennedy proposed a similar amendment to require the
President to submit tax reform proposals in 1972.1o Perhaps these amend-
ments reflect congressional expressions that presidential cooperation is
essential to major tax reform. They are certainly not serious attempts to
delegate congressional responsibility to the Executive, for once the Presi-
dent's proposals are forwarded the Congress will carefully guard its pre-
rogatives to reject or modify his suggestions. For the foreseeable future,
therefore, the Congress will continue to make basic decisions of tax
policy; it will exercise full control over the tax legislative process
until a bill is passed by both houses and sent to the President for his
signature or veto.40 Rather than attempting to exercise power which
Destroy, Washington Post, Dec. 7, 1969, at C7, col. 3. See also Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 10, 1969, at 22, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, at 46, col. 1.
86 Congress has delegated power to the President to vary rates of the Interest
Equalization Tax. See her. Ray. CODE OF 1954 § 4911(b) (2). But this is a minor deviation
from congressional control over tax rates.
87 See note 186 infra and accompanying text.
88 Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, § 110, Pub. L. No. 90-364, 82 Stat.
251 (1968).
89 Amendment No. 1479 to H.R. 14370, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., debated at 118 CoNG.
REc. S. 14,394-401 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972).
40The President, however, does derive power to act through the rulemaking au-
thority which Congress has delegated to the Treasury. Although this delegation of
authority is ordinarily limited to relatively technical matters in areas requiring special
administrative expertise or posing potential administrative problems, the delegation may
be quite broad. The granting of authority to prescribe the rules governing depreciation
allowances is an example of a broad delegation. Acting through the authority of the
Treasury, the President in 1971 was able to effectuate changes in depreciation policy
involving an annual revenue loss of close to $4 billion. Congress subsequently modified
the President's depreciation changes in the Revenue Act of 1971.
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it may not even have-the power to compel presidential recommenda-
tions-the Congress should concentrate its efforts to insure that its own
processes for enacting tax legislation are designed to obtain as much in-
formation as possible and to use this information effectively in reaching
,difficult decisions.
THE INFORMATION-GATHERING PROCESS
Developing and maintaining an appropriate tax structure for a nation
as economically complex and dynamic as the United States is a mam-
moth task. Often the resolution of arcane and technical issues of tax
policy may have a profound impact on the domestic economy which is
elusive or immeasurable. Given the immensity of the task, the basic
work has been performed extraordinarily well; the American tax system
compares favorably with any in the world. This is a tribute both to
the legislators-and to those who assist them in considering and enacting
the tax laws.
The tax structure is far from perfect, however, and tax reform is
'inevitable in the coming years. If this reform effort is to be successful,
the legislators and the public must be as well informed as possible. And,
while the present legislative process has operated well in the past, the
system by which Congress receives and evaluates the facts that underlie
its substantive choices is deficient in a number of respects. These de-
ficiencies are in some cases paralleled by Congress' failure adequately to
inform the public of the rationale for the actions it is taking. In either
case the tax reform effort suffers-those enacting the law are not pro-
vided optimal information; those seeking to understand the law and
comply with it are sometimes deprived of useful knowledge concerning
the legislators' intentions. These are areas ripe for revision.
Revision of the Public Hearing Forum
Congressman Wilbur Mills has announced that the Ways and Means
Committee will undertake a "thoroughgoing and extensive review of the
entire federal system" early in 1973 with a view toward producing a
rajor tax reform bill.4 In addition to disagreeing with some of the
present substantive tax policies, Congressman Mills is apparently dissatis-
fied with the present process for considering tax reform legislation. In
May, 1972 he introduced the "Tax Policy Review Act of 1972 142 which
41BNA Daily Report for Executives, Sept. 8, 1972, DER No. 176, at 1. See also
Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1972, at 22, col. 2.
42 H.R. 15230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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would have eliminated fifty-four "tax preference" provisions over a
three year period, stating that by repealing those benefits his bill was
designed to guarantee that "tax reform will be considered in the period
ahead in a manner which will give assurance of . . . an orderly and
systematic review of virtually all provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code giving any special exclusion or deduction or special tax rate to
any particular type of group or category of income."4
Beneficiaries of tax preference provisions have come to regard them as
a matter of right. Typical of this attitude is the statement of a Standard
Oil executive to the Senate Finance Committee that a half a century of
faith in stable tax treatment of the industry would have been breached
if the depletion allowance were reduced.44 Congressman Mill's bill would
have reversed this relationship and shifted the burden to the proponents
of specified tax preference provisions, requiring them to demonstrate
that congressional reinstatement of the tax preference would serve the
national interest. Thus, many supporters of tax reform applauded Con-
gressman Mill's proposal as a novel approach to the elimination of special
tax provisions.45 But the procedure proposed in this bill carries substantial
risks. By setting termination dates for tax provisions that significantly
affect investment decisions, enactment of the bill would cause immediate
economic uncertainties and disruptions. For example, enacting a termi-
nation date for the deduction for state taxes and eliminating the exemp-
tion for interest on state and local bonds could cause serious difficulties
for those responsible for planning the financing of state and local gov-
ernments. Moreover, an immediate impact could occur in the market
for state and local bonds.46 Acknowledging the possible "uncertainties
and undesirable economic effects" that might be created by the auto-
43 Statement of Congressman Wilbur Mills, May 31, 1972 (Press release introducing
H.R. 15230, the 'Tax Policy Review Act of 1972," CCH 1972 STAND. FED. TAX REP. vol.
59, p.II, no. 31 v-vi (June 7, 1972)..
44Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the Senate Comm'n. on Finance,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5, at 4410-14 (1969) (Testimony of George V. Myers, Director
and Executive Vice President of Standard Oil Co. of Indiana).
45 Common Cause described it as "an essential first step in opening the door leading
to tax justice." Hearings on Administration Request for Increase in Public Debt Ceiling
Before the House Conmittee on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 312 (State-
ment of Mitchell Rogovin, General Counsel, Common Cause).
46 Other market disruptions would likely follow passage of a bill such as Mills' Tax
Policy Review Act of 1972. For example, the bill would have substantially modified the
tax treatment of capital assets by cutting back on depreciation allowances in two stages
and repealing the investment credit. An increase in investment, could have been ex-
pected prior to each of the three repeal dates as taxpayers attempted to take, ad-
vantage of the more liberal tax benefits. .
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matic termination provisions, Mills abandoned his bil 4 7 in favor of a
measure introduced by Congressman Ullman which merely calls for a
comprehensive review of the tax structure during 1973 and 1974.48
Although the drawbacks of the Mills bill clearly seem to outweigh its
advantages, the measure did dramatize the need to improve the process
for congressional consideration of major tax reform. In 1969 the Ways
and Means Committee began its consideration of tax reform with a press
release announcing that public hearings would be held on seventeen
specified tax reform subjects. 49 The press release reflected many of the
same issues discussed in a four volume document containing the compre-
hensive recommendations of the Johnson Administration's Treasury
staff. This document, published by the Ways and Means and Finance
Committees prior to the 1969 House public hearings, set forth the
Treasury staff's tax reform recommendations and its supporting rationale
and served to direct the attention of the witnesses testifying at the public
hearings to those issues. The need for an initial focus of the public debate
was particularly great in 1969. As the Nixon Administration had just
taken office, it was unable to issue its own recommendations until the
close of the public hearings.50 Thus, without the focus supplied by the
47 BNA Daily Report for Executives, supra note 41, at 1.48H.R. 15360, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
49 Press Release of Chairman Wilbur Mills, Committee on Ways and Means, January
29, 1969, Hearings on Tax Reform, 1969, Before the House Conmittee on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong, 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5-12 (1969). The seventeen topics were:
1. Tax Exempt Foundations
2. Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions
3. Other deductions
4. Standard Deduction
5. Minimum and Maximum Income Tax on Individuals
6. Tax Treatment of the Elderly
7. Deferred Executive Compensation
8. Income Averaging
9. Taxation of Single Persons
10. Capital Gains
11. Foreign Tax Credit
12. Multiple Trusts
13. Tax Treatment of Business Income
14. Tax Treatment of State Municipal Bonds (sic)
15. Possible Revisions of Tax Provisions Relating to Corporate Mergers
16. Estate and Gift Taxes
17. Treatment of Tax Depreciation by Regulatory Agencies
50 Although the hearings had begun on February 17, 1969, the President's recom-
mendations were not presented until April 22. Tax Reform Proposals Contained in the
Message from the President of April 21, 1969, Before the House Commfittee on Ways
and Means, 91st Cong, 1st Sess., at 1 (1969). This delay was occasioned by the pressures
of time, the President having taken office less than one month before the start of the
hearings.
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press release and reference to the previous Administration's proposals,
-the Ways and Means' public hearings might have languished without
direction for a considerable period of time.
As in the past, the public hearings in 1969 proved to be an inefficient
means of contributing to the members' understanding of the issues or to
their proper resolution. The public hearings before the Ways and Means
Committee on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 lasted more than two months.
During that time more than 600 witnesses appeared, producing over
,fourteen pounds of testimony. Most of the testimony was in support of
the pecuniary interests of the particular witness or of the industry he rep-
resented.51 Much was repetitious and had little impact on committee deci-
sions. Additionally, the committee members' attendance at the hearings
varied greatly; on many occasions only two or three Congressmen were
present. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Laurence Woodworth,
the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxa-
tion, expressed his dissatisfaction with the public hearing process and
questioned whether the present procedure "always represents the best
use of the Committee member's time."'52
The public hearing process would be vastly improved if, as Dr.
Woodworth has suggested,53 the committees required that persons wish-
ing to testify submit a written statement in advance of the hearings. This
-would enable the committee staffs or the Joint Committee staff to sum-
marize the positions taken by each person. The committee could then
review these summaries and invite a number of witnesses to submit oral
testimony in a manner that would elicit a cross section of opinion with-
out attracting repetitious and irrelevant statements. Additionally, the
availability of a complete statement of those witnesses who are selected
to appear before the committees would enable Congressmen to prepare
questions on the issues raised by their testimony.
The public hearing procedure would also be substantially improved if,
prior to the hearings, the members of the committes educated themselves
in depth on the issues to be considered. This could be achieved by hold-
ing informal meetings among committee members and panels of experts
selected from members of the tax bar, academic tax lawyers, public
finance economists, and public interest groups. Similar discussions should
be held with the Treasury and Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation. These preliminary consultations would place Con-
51 See text accompanying note 111, infra.
52 Woodworth, supt'a note 29, at 408.
53Id.
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gressmen in a far better position to question incisively witnesses who
appear at the public hearings.54
The tax writing committees could improve their ability to deal with
more specialized areas of the law by forming subcommittees to develop
expertise and make recommendations on particular issues of tax legisla-
tion. Thoughtful recommendations made in 1959 on the taxation of
partnerships and corporations have languished without committee atten-
tion during the past thirteen years.5 5 While much of this inattention can
be explained by the committee's heavy workload, " the formation of
subcommittees to consider these matters could have led to some action
on several of these recommendations. Estate and gift taxation, a subject
which seems certain to be considered in the next tax reform effort, is an
ideal example of an issue that would benefit from a subcommittee's
attention.5 T
If a subcommittee system is to produce significant benefits, substantial
power must be delegated to these bodies. Full review of the subcom-
mittee's efforts by the full committee would result in a duplication of the
initial labors and substantially greater inefficiencies. Significant delegation
of authority is most important in the case of subcommittees formed by
the House Ways and Means Committee. Since the Ways and Means
Committee plays a more pivotal role in the initial formulation of tax
54 The Ways and Means Committee has used such a procedure in the past. For exam-
ple, in 1954 the Ways and Means Special Subcommittee on the Taxation of Life Insurance
Companies held a few days of informal sessions with representatives from the Treasury,
the Joint Committee staff, state insurance commissioners and the life insurance industry.
The group then issued a position paper which served to focus debate at the public
hearings. See generally Curtis, The House Committee on Ways and Means: Congress
Seen Through a Key Conmzittee, 1966 Wisc. L. REv. 121, 126 28 (1966).
55 For a discussion of the tax treatment of partners, see HovsE CoMm. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86T CONG., Isr SEss., TAx REvISION COMPENDruM, pt. 3, at 1707 (Comm. Print
1959). For a discussion of tax treatment of corporations, see id. at 1767.
56 In addition to tax matters the Committee has jurisdiction over social security, wel-
fare, health insurance, revenue sharing, trade and tariffs, and the level of the public debt.
57 The issues of estate and gift tax reform are extremely complex. See, e.g., HousE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs AND SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91sT CONG., lsr SEss., U. S.
TRAasutay DEPARTMENT TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOsALS, pt. 3, at 384-401 (Comm.
Print 1969) (discussion concerning revision of the tax treatment of generation-skipping
transfers). Moreover, relatively little revenue is involved. The estate and gift taxes pro-
duce about $4 billion annually, less than two percent of federal revenues. ExEcurivE OF-
FICE OF THE PFSMIENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE U. S. Gov'T,
FISCAL YEAR 1971 (1972) (adjusted figure). If desired, the full committee could provide
general goals for the subcommittee. There are numerous other areas of the tax laws
that could benefit from subcommittee attention. The tax treatment of small business
(Subchapter S) corporations and cooperatives are additional examples.
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legislation, its subcommittees will initially bear more significant respon-
sibilities than will the Senate subcommittees.
Finally, Congress would be well-advised to utilize the expertise that it
accumulates from consideration of earlier tax reform proposals.5 s The
1973 Congress could benefit from the expertise that remains from the
1969 tax reform effort. That effort attuned most of the committee mem-
bers to the issues of tax reform, and many have already formed tentative
judgments on some questions. Under these circumstances, the ordinary
process might be reversed. In 1973, consideration of tax reform could
begin with the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, com-
posed of the five senior members of both the House Ways and Means
and Senate Finance Committees, meeting in executive sessions with
Treasury and the Joint Committee staff to draft a committee report
containing its recommendations for tax reform." Since the members of
the Joint Committee will probably serve on a conference committee
when the House and Senate pass tax reform bills, their views concern-
ing appropriate tax reform measures will carry great weight.
The process would be similar in effect to a procedure used in the
parliamentary systems of government in Great Britain and Canada.
The Government, which in a parliamentary system generally has suffi-
cient control over the legislature to assure enactment of its proposals,
will often issue a Green Paper setting forth a tentative description of
action it proposes to take. The paper will elicit comment which the
Government considers in finalizing its position. A Joint Committee re-
port could serve much the same purpose as the Green Paper, providing
a statement of key congressional members' best collective judgment on
tax reform issues. In addition, it would offer a useful supplement to the
Administration position. Examination of the two documents would pro-
vide a relatively reliable indication of the areas in which Congress and
the Administration will agree. Persons wishing to testify before the
Ways and Means Committee could structure their statements accord-
ingly, concentrating on areas in which they felt they could or should
exercise the most significant impact. Thus, the committee could begin
its public hearings with testimony more clearly directed to the important
58 Obviously, the bite of electoral politics and the retirement of committee members
will cause some attrition of the knowledgeable Congressmen. Nonetheless, many com-
mittee members have participated in the consideration and passage of numerous tax bills.
Two thirds of the present membership of the House Ways and Means Committee par-
ticipated in the consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
59 The Joint Committee issued preliminary proposals in 1945 which led to the Tax
Adjustment Act of 1946.
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issues. In most cases the Administration would begin the public hearings
with a statement of its position. Subsequent testimony would then
probably tend to concentrate on the differences between the Admini-
stration position and the Joint Committee recommendations.
Some could object to the practice of opening the public hearings with
a statement of position of the Joint Committee since it would tend to
weaken the voice of some of the junior members of the tax writing
committees who are not on the Joint Committee. This criticism does not
seem dispositive. If the subcommittee practice were adopted in conjunc-
tion with the Joint Committee's issuance of its position paper, the junior
committee members who served on those bodies would gain the oppor-
tunity to play an often decisive role in shaping the policy on specific
issues. An alternative to the Joint Committee's issuance of of its position
paper would be for the House Ways and Means Committee, after meet-
ing in executive session with Treasury and the Joint Committee staff, to
issue a statement of position prior to opening the public hearings. By
meeting to develop the position paper, the committee members would
become well versed in the issues of tax reform at an early stage of the
process. Compromises necessary to produce the position paper would
illuminate the opposing considerations relative to particular issues. Pub-
lication of the position paper would in turn focus the public comment
to areas of particular concern to the committee.
Adoption of these proposals would produce a much more orderly and
efficient process. The tax reform effort would begin with the Admini-
stration's announcement of its position on the major questions, followed
by meetings of the Joint Committee or the Ways and Means Committee
to develop a position paper. While the formulation of that position paper
was going on, other members of the tax writing committees could begin
meeting in subcommittee to initiate work on specific issues in discrete
areas of the law. Issuance of the position paper would be followed by
written comments from the public which would be summarized for the
Ways and Means Committee by the Joint Committee staff. The com-
mittee could then meet to discuss informally the issues raised by the
written comments and to select witnesses for testimony at the public
hearings. Since under this procedure the members of the committees
would be far more knowledgeable on the issues to be considered in the
public hearings, their questioning of the witness would be much more
incisive than it is under present practices. Moreover, the actual public
hearing process would be considerably more streamlined both in terms
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of the number of witnesses and the focus of their testimony. The cumu-
lative effect of these alterations in the information-gathering system
would be a better informed Congress concentrating on the specific issues
that it must resolve in the tax reform effort.
Main Sources of Information:
The Treasury and the Joint Committee Staffs
Regardless of the mechanics of the process for enacting tax legislation,
Congress will rely heavily in making its decisions on the information
received from two critical sources-the Treasury Department and the
Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. It is there-
fore important that Congress develop means to maximize these bodies'
utility as suppliers of data and information.
The Treasury Department often plays a dual role in presenting pro-
posals to the Congress. Its recognized expertise often prompts the tax
writing committees to look to Treasury for an objective evaluation of
a proposal's impact on the elusive goals of tax equity and simplicity,
economic vitality, and administrative feasibility. 0 On the other hand,
as the principal representative of the President on tax matters, Treasury
is expected to function as a powerful and effective advocate of his pro-
posals.6 ' The severity of this conflict of roles generally depends upon the
political significance of the issue at hand. For example, Treasury's posi-
tion on the oil denletion allowance was not controlled by tax equity
considerations. By contrast, its testimony before the Ways and Means
Committee in May of 1972 concerning the appropriate tax treatment
of single and married persons exemplifies thoughtful and objective
analysis.6 2
Treasury's need to wear two hats may limit its performance of both
roles. It is hard to be sure when a lobbyist is being objective or when
an analyst is lobbying; Treasury's dual responsibility thus complicates
the congressional decision-making task. But it is not practical to expect
Treasury to discard either role. Congress must therefore exercise care
in evaluating its testimony.
Congressional staffing in the tax area is atypical. Both the Ways and
Means Committee and the Finance Committee have small but very able
601For a discussion of Treasury's role in the formation of tax proposals, see note 25,
supra.
61Such conflicting duties exist in other executive departments, as the controversies
between Congress and the Defense Department illustrate.
*2 Married Single Hearings, supra note 9.
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staffs which generally concentrate on nontax matters. 6 The primary
congressional staff work in tax legislation is performed by the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. The Joint Commit-
tee, established in 1926, now serves primarily to provide a technical tax
staff to both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Fi-
nance Committee. This expert tax staff, composed of lawyers, econo-
mists, accountants, and statistical analysts, is continuously at the disposal
of all members of the Ways and Means and Finance Committees. "
The Joint Committee staff and the Treasury follow a tax proposal
from its genesis to final enactment. Both are present at the public hear-
ings, where the Secretary of the Treasury is usually the key witness.
Both are usually invited to attend the executive sessions of the Ways
and Means, Finance, and Conference Committees-the Treasury to state
the Administration position and answer questions; the Joint Committee
staff to provide information, analysis, and recommendations. Both are in-
volved in drafting statutory language and committee reports.65 At every
stage of the legislative process, the Congress relies heavily on informa-
tion and analyses supplied by both. A tax reform effort therefore de-
mands that Congress obtain the best possible information from these two
sources. New kinds of information must be developed, and the presen-
tation of information should be refined.
Coordination of Tax Proposals 'with Direct Governmental Actions
Tax proposals are sometimes advanced to further governmental ob-
jectives other than revenue-raising or control of fiscal policy. The pro-
posal to allow a tax credit for tuition paid to private schools provides
3 However, the Chief Counsel of each of these staffs is an experienced tax authority.
Each staff also has two attorneys who devote their time exclusively to tax matters.6 4 In addition to the Chief of Staff, there are twenty-two professional persons on the
staff: thirteen tax lawyers, four economists, four revenue estimators and one accountant.
Woodworth, supra note 29, at 406.
65 The House and Senate Legislative Counsels are responsible for drafting the statu-
tory language with the assistance of the committee staffs, the Joint Committee staff, the
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. The Joint Committee staff is responsible for
the committee reports, which it prepares after consultation with the other staffs. There
have been suggestions that individual committee member's staffs should be present in
executive sessions to advise them. See, e.g., Married Single Hearings, supra note 9, at 65
(Testimony of Albert H. Turkus). One objection to the procedure is that it might
encourage some members to be absent, leaving much of the discussion to be carried on
by a group of aides. Woodworth, supra note 29, at 409.
The invitation to attend the executive session is not automatically extended. In 1972




one recent example.66 Many proposals of this type have become law; the
system is replete with provisions for special tax treatment to encourage
particular activities or investments. Important examples of tax legislation
of this kind are the deduction for percentage depletions6 and the ex-
emption for interest from state and local bonds.6 8 Other provisions,
such as the marijuana tax,69 have been specifically designed to discourage
certain activities. Recently, proposals have been made to tax the lead
conteiit of gasoline and emissions of sulphur into the atmosphere.
The decision to use the tax system for such purposes may carry sub-
stantial risks.70 The tax proposal may be a less efficient means of fulfilling
the social objectives than resort to direct regulation or a subsidy program.
In some cases, the tax program may duplicate or contradict other direct
subsidies or regulations; and it quite often will introduce new inequities
and complexities into the tax law. The 1969 tax reform effort focused
on many of these provisions and this will undoubtedly reoccur when
the Congress next considers tax reform. Still, only a bare start toward
identifying and evaluating these problems has been made.
In recent years the Treasury has published a "tax expenditure budget"
containing estimates of the revenue foregone because of certain tax
provisions.7 The conference report on the Revenue Act of 1971 di-
rected the Treasury and the Joint Committee staff to prepare a more
detailed report on these provisions which should be available when
66 See Hearings on Tax Credits for Nonpublic Education, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
67 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
881d. § 103.
6 Id. §§ 4741, 4751, repealed in Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1292 (Oct. 23, 1970).
70 See, Surrey, Tax Incentives at a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 H1ARv. L. REv. 705 (1970); Surrey,
Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Ex-
penditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 Htuv. L. REV. 352 (1970).
71 See, e.g., U.S. DEARTMENT OF Tm TREASURY, ANNUAL. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
muTREASURY ON THE STATE OF FINANCES 339 (1968). See generally, Statement of Edwin
S. Cohen Before the Joint Economic Comm. Congress of the United States, Dept. of
the Treasury News, July 21, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Cohen J. E. C. Statement]. The
Revenue Act of 1971 as passed by the Senate would have amended the Budget and
Accounting Act to require the budget submitted by the President to contain estimates
of revenue losses from tax provisions and estimates of indirect expenditures through the
operation of the tax system. In conference a decision was made requiring the Treasury
to submit such estimates to the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance
Committee and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation and to publish such
information in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury. See H.R. REP. 92-
708, 92d ong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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Congress considers tax reform in 1973 .7 Hopefully, this report will co-
ordinate information and analyses of tax subsidies with informatiori
describing direct government programs in related fields. It is important,
for example, that both the tax and appropriations committees know that
the estimated revenue loss in 1971 from special provisions in the natural
resource area was -60% of the direct expenditures; that the loss in com-
merce and transportation was 80%; and that the tax loss in community
development and housing amounted to 140% of the direct expend-
itures.73
ICongress should not be satisfied to receive this data only with respect
to existing tax provisions. The information should be updated annually
and each new proposal should be subjected to this scrutiny. For example,
in I969, when Congress enacted special tax incentives to encourage pur-
chases of railroad rolling stock 4 and coal mine safety equipment,75 it
gav6 little attention to these problems. The rapid write-off afforded
railroad rolling stock was a substitute for the investment. credit repealed
by the 1969 Act.7 In its testimony before the Senate Finance Committee,
Treasury opposed the railroad rolling stock proposals but did not present
any details about direct subsidies or regulations bearing on transportation
priorities.
Since 1969, some tax proposals have been subjected to greater scrutiny.
The Ways and Means Committee rejected the President's proposal to
tax the lead content in gasoline in part because of exposure of conflicts
between the tax proposal and pollution regulations during the public
hearings77 and the executive sessions. But the Ways and Means Commit-
72 Cohen 1. E. C. Statement, supra note 71, at 9-10.
7 3 The percentage computations represent the ratio of tax expenditures over direct
expenditures. Direct expenditures, classified according to the functional categories of
government expenditure used in the budget, were derived from the 1971 estimates as
they appear in the 1972 budget. ExEcunvE OFFICE OF Tm PRESIDEr, OFFICE OF MANAGE-
MENT & BUmr, THE BUDGET OF THE UNTED STATES GOVERNMENT, Fiscal Year 1972, at 138
(Education & Manpower), 120 (Commerce & Transportation), 129 (Housing & Com-
munity Development). Tax expenditures for calendar year 1971 were classified in
similar fashion. Cohen J.E.C. Statement, supra note 71, Appendix D, at 1-2. For similar
comparisons for 1968, see Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern-
ment Policy: A Comparison 'with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HAxv. L. Rxv.
705, 709-10 (1970). Caution must be exercised in making such comparisons because of
revenue estimating difficulties. See notes 85-103 infra and accompanying text.
74 INT. REv. CoD of 1954, 184.
75 Id. at § 187.
70 See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1969).
77 See Hearings on Tax Recommendations of the President Before the House Ways
and Means Comm, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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tee failed to command consideration of this issue when it examined the
President's proposal for a tax credit for tuition payments to private
schools. Even though Secretary Richardson of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare testified with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the committee did not require these witnesses to evaluate the
tax proposal in conjunction with direct expenditure programs and ju.
tify the value of the program in the context of HEW's overall educa-
tion program. 71
The practice of enacting new tax incentives with little regard for the
extent and nature of direct government programs should cease. Congress
should require the Treasury and the Joint Committee staff to provide
it sufficient information to make informed judgments on the relationship
between tax provisions and other- government programs and should
weigh this consideration in determining whether existing tax provisions
should be retained and new tax proposals enacted. Tax proposals to
further nonrevenue raising objectives simply cannot be properly evalu-
ated without this kind of analysis.
Ongoing Statistical and Economic Analyses
In addition to meeting the need to coordinate direct expenditures and
tax expenditures, Congress should continually study and evaluate the
tax system to assess its fairness and determine its efficiency in per-
forming its economic functions. Congress and the staffs now fail to
give adequate consideration to the achievements or failures of the pro-
grams they have enacted. And, by not looking back to assess adequately
the programs they have enacted, Congress loses a valuable opportunity
to measure the possibility of success of proposals under consideration.
Review of the recent history of tax increases and decreases to further
short-term fiscal policies reveals the importance of this continual evalua-
tion. In 1971 President Nixon proposed four major tax measures to stim-
ulate economic growth and recovery: elimination of the automobile excise
tax, tax reductions for individuals, restoration of the investment credit,
78 See generally, Hearings on Tax Credits for Nonpublic Education Before the House
Ways and Means Conmzittee, 92nd Cong, 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1-60 (1972). A subject of
particular concern on this measure is the constitutionality of this method of encouraging
private education. In Essex v. Wolman, 41 U.S.L.W, 3167 (Oct. 10, 1972), the United
States Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision invalidating an Ohio statute that
permitted partial reimbursement of tuition to parents with children in private schools.
The lower court had determined that the primary recipients of the provision were
religious institutions and that the act violated the First Amendment proscription. Some
have suggested that granting a tax credit would not violate the constitutional prohibitiofi.
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and liberalization of depreciation allowances. Tax reductions for indi-
viduals, the investment credit, and liberalized depreciation allowances
were proposed by President Kennedy in the early 1960's when he was
faced with similar economic problems. The investment credit was re-
moved in 1966, reinstated in 1967, and repealed in 1969. Individual in-
come taxes were increased in 1968 and reduced in 1970. The automobile
excise tax was reduced in 1965 but the reductions postponed in 1969
and 1970. No one can be sure of the precise effect of any one of these
changes, much less of them all. While general trends resulting from these
changes have been noted, much additional information and analysis is
needed if the Government plans to continue, roughly on a biannual
basis, to use the tax system to effectuate fiscal policies.
The 1971 depreciation revision provides a useful illustration of the
problem. Institution of the new ADR system of depreciation which pro-
vided greater depreciation allowances for business assets was hotly con-
tested. Opponents alleged that it would be a relatively inefficient im-
plement of fiscal policy. Treasury contended otherwise, citing for sup-
port the general success of President Kennedy's program. The amount
of revenue involved was substantial-an average of almost $4 billion was
estimated to be lost annually by the new system. Unfortunately, the
decision on this issue had to be made without adequate data reflecting
the effect of the similar liberalization of depreciation allowances made
nine years earlier. Information on the depreciation lives of business
assets was simply not available. And, while the new depreciation system
specifically remedied the problem of gathering information on deprecia-
tion lives,7" the general problem remains.
79 A comprehensive system of depreciation accounting is prescribed by the ADR
System, requiring in particular the use of closed-end vintage accounts under which assets
are accounted for by year of acquisition. Taxpayers are required to file annual schedules
with their tax returns providing information on asset acquisitions and asset retirements
by vintage accounts, showing the amount, type, and age of assets retired. The required
information also includes experience with respect to the repair, maintenance, rehabilita-
tion, or improvement of assets in each guideline class.
This system of depreciation accounting and information reporting will enable the
Treasury Department for the first time to compile annual data on a systematic basis
as to the periods of actual use of property which is subject to depreciation. Further, the
system will provide data on repair and maintenance expenditures that will permit the
refinement of rules for expensing or capitalizing such expenditures. In connection with
the ADR system, the Office of Industrial Economics was established in the Internal
Revenue Service to collect and review these data and other materials. This will provide
a basis in the future for establishing or changing guideline classes, guideline lives, the
ranges provided for various guidelines classes, the repair allowances for various guideline
classes, and other elements of the ADR system. ADR PAMPHZr, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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Congress presendy receives too little analysis of information concern-
ing the effects of past changes. Once a provision has been enacted, it is
often forgotten. It becomes imbedded in tax law, removable only after
presentation of overwhelming evidence of its inefficiency. Congress
has recently shown an increasing awareness of this problem and has
begun to take steps to force periodic reconsideration of tax measures.
The 1969 Act provides that certain measures expire five years after
passage.80 Congressman Mills' 1972 Tax Policy Review Act proposal also
reflects concern for this problem."' But the shortage of analysis remains
and the tax reform effort suffers without it.
The need for consideration of the effects of the actual operation of
existing provisions will be particularly acute in 1973 due to the magni-
tude of the revisions enacted in the 1969 tax reform effort. The 1969
Act revamped the tax treatment of charitable contributions, private
foundations, income from capital gains and earnings, real estate deprecia-
tion, and percentage depletion, among others. Every available research
tool must be utilized to evaluate the 1969 changes and to use this in-
formation in projecting the potential effects of future changes.82 Con-
gress must receive this kind of evaluation before it can intelligently
consider further alterations of the tax structure.
In one major respect, the substantive tax law inhibits evaluation of the
fairness of the tax system. In determining effective rates of tax or com-
paring tax rates of individuals, analysts typically begin with statistics of
income based on "adjusted gross income" classes.83 Adjusted gross in-
come, as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, comes closer to a net in-
come concept than any other item on tax returns. But, inconsistencies in
the Code definition of adjusted gross income distort analysis. Many items
of income are not encompassed within the Code definition. For example,
8 0 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1969, § 167(k) (relating to rehabilitation of low-income
housing). This provision was retained for certain new incentives enacted in 1971. See,
e~g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1971, § 188 (relating to the amortization of certain expenses for
on-the-job training and child care facilities). The Treasury should be required to
submit to Congress periodic reports on the efficacy of tax provisions and to make these
publicly available.
81 See text accompanying notes 42-48, supra.
82 The need for ongoing analysis also exists with respect to proposals which are not
enacted in a particular year but which may be reproposed in subsequent years. Examples
of such proposals are the taxation of capital gains at death, tax credit for political con-
tributions, and interest subsidies for taxable state and local bonds.
83 See, e.g., Hearings on the Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs Before the Sub
committee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee;
92d Cong, 1st Sess., at 59-73 (testimony of Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner).
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only one-half of capital gains income is generally considered within the
adjusted gross income concept and no income from tax exempt interest
is included in the Code definition. Moreover, while expenses incurred
in producing business income are deducted in computing adjusted gross
income, expenses incurred to produce investment income are not. These
investment expenses are treated in the same way as personal deductions
such as charitable contributions and state sales taxes. Thus, a person who
incurs $200,000 of business expenses to produce $200,000 of income will
have adjusted gross income of zero, while one who incurs $200,000 of
investment expenses to produce $200,000 of income will have $200,000
of adjusted gross income even though his net income was zero. This latter
individual will be described as having $200,000 of adjusted gross income
and paying no tax, and his inclusion in the $200,000 adjusted gross in-
come class will lower the effective tax rates for that class. The business
taxpayer, whose net income is the same, will be included in the class
of taxpayers with zero adjusted gross income. These inconsistencies
make meaningful analysis even more difficult. Thus, Congress should
alter the statutory definition of adjusted gross income to produce a more
consistent and more accurate approximation of a net income concept
and thereby facilitate needed study of the tax system.84
Revenue Estimates
One question invariably must be answered before a decision to support
a change in the tax laws is made: "What is the revenue effect"? If the
proposal is one to implement fiscal policy, revenue considerations will
dictate the scope of the recommended changes. If the revenue loss from
the change appears too great, the measure will often be rejected or, at
a minimum, substantially modified to decrease the loss. When the issue is
tax reform, Congressmen will often wish to produce a "balanced" pack-
age, offsetting the revenue gained from revenue-generating tax reforms
with tax relief provisions usually designed to lessen the burden of low
and moderate income taxpayers. On many occasions during congres-
sional consideration of the 1969 Act, members of the Ways and Means
and the Senate Finance Committees would take out their pencils and
84 Speech of Edwin S. Cohen before the Federal Tax Institute of New England,
Boston, Mass, April 29, 1972, at 12. There are difficulties in attempting to construct a
perfect definition of adjusted income. For example, tracing interest expenses to income
presents particularly difficult problems. In addition, other inconsistencies afflict the
present definition of adjusted gross income. Moving expenses, for instance, are deducted
before arriving at adjusted gross income, but union dues and child care expenses are not.
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begin adding the revenue losses and gains from the bill's various pro-
visions. The total estimated gains from the tax reform provisions of the
1969 Act had a limiting effect on the size and scope of the tax relief
measures. For example, revenue cost is an important reason why the
standard deduction today is limited to $2,000.85 Moreover, the 1969 tax
relief provisions were phased in over a number of years because of
revenue considerations.86 Since the revenue projections may dominate
tax policy decisions, the accuracy of the estimates is a subject of critical
importance.8 7
If, as many expect, the next round of tax reform is debated at a time
when a tax increase is considered necessary, revenue considerations may
again dominate the decision-making process. Examination of suggested
modifications of the present treatment of property at death affords an
example of the impact of revenue considerations. Under present law
if a taxpayer owns property at death, no income tax is collected on the
increase in value of the property that occurred during the period of his
ownership. Senator McGovern proposed to tax the appreciation in value
of such assets, and his proposal was estimated to produce $4 billion in
revenue by 1975.88 In 1968, the Treasury staff advanced a similar propo-
sal, but limited the tax to gains that accrued after enactment of the new
provision and coupled the new provision with an equivalent reduction in
estate taxes."" Thus, the 1968 Treasury staff proposal would not have
produced an amount of annual revenue corresponding to that of Senator
McGovern's proposal until at least ten years after enactment, and the
increase in revenues would have been offset by the estate tax reduction.90
The exemption of pre-enactment gains was apparently included in the
1968 Treasury proposal because it was considered inequitable to tax gains
which had accrued prior to enactment. The estate tax reduction was
designed to maintain the existing level of deathtime taxes. But the need
for revenue outweighed these considerations when Senator McGovern
advanced his proposals; both exemptions were abandoned.91
Notwithstanding the critical significance of revenue estimates in the
85 See MARRIED SIrNLE HEAINGs, supra note 9, at 78.
86 See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORm ACT, supra note 19, at 13-16.
87 For a more detailed discussion of the subject, see R. BLOUGH, supra note 12, at 287,
,299-303.
88 Summary of McGovern's Proposals for Federal Tax Reform, supra note 4.
89 See generally TAx STuDmas AND PRoPosALs OF Tm UsnFmn STATES TREAsURY DEPART-
MENT 91sr CoNG., 1sT Sxss., pt. 3, at 331-40, 355-57 (Comm. Print 1969).
90 d.
91 Summary of McGovern's Proposals for Federal Tax Reform, supra note 4.
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enactment of tax proposals,9 2 few people outside of a small group of
economists know very much about the process of revenue estimating.
Many tax lawyers are unaware of the importance of the estimates, and
the press rarely questions their accuracy. More importantly, decision-
makers in the Executive branch and the Congress tend to accept esti-
mates without attempting to make a qualitative distinction as to their
comparative reliability. If Congress is to maximize its reform effort it
must find better ways to evaluate the projections on which it relies.
On the spending side of the budget, allocations to various programs
can be made with a somewhat greater degree of certainty. Although
certain spending items are "uncontrollable," the cost of a particular pro-
gram will generally not exceed the amount appropriated. Thus, there
typically comes a point when the government must stop writing checks.
Not so on the revenue side. Revenues foregone through a particular tax
provision can be virtually boundless, limited only by the ability and
willingness of persons to engage in the activity that enjoys tax-favored
status.
Because revenue estimates are projections of future events, they are
necessarily uncertain. Although the Treasury Department and the Joint
Committee staff do an admirable job of predicting the impact of pro-
posed tax measures, the difficulty of the task renders uniformly accurate
projection impossible. For example, in 1969 the new minimum tax on
individuals was estimated to produce close to $300 million in revenue
in 1970;93 less than $117 million was actually realized. 4 The primary
reason for the disappointing revenue production was an unexpected
turn of events: 1970, a year of recession, produced far less capital gains
income than was anticipated in 1969, the year in which the estimate
was made.
While uncertainties are always present to some extent, revenue esti-
mates range from very reliable projections to educated guesses. Several
factors affect the reliability of an estimate. Most important is the quality
of underlying data from which the estimate is derived. The best data is
found in the Treasury tax models derived from the Statistics of Income
which is based on information taken from tax returns. Data derived from
. 92 Congress now requires that the committees provide a revenue estimate with any
revenue measure, projecting its anticipated revenue gains or losses for the following
year. 2 U.S.C. 5 190(j) (Supp. 1972).
93 GENERAL EXPLANATON OF THE TAX REFoRM Acr, supra note 19, at 20.
9 4 
INRNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT, STATISTICS OF INCoME-1970 IN-
DIVIDUAL INcOME TAx RETuRNs 24 (1972).
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sources other than tax returns, such as from the Census Bureau or the
Bureau of Labor Statistics or National Income Statistics, ordinarily pro-
duce less reliable revenue estimates. Income as defined by the Census
Bureau includes transfer payments, such as social security payments,
which are excluded from income under the Internal Revenue Code.
Similarly, census information is taken from "households" which may
include one tax return or several. Accounting for income tax purposes
may differ from that used for other purposes. The data from sources
other than tax returns must be adjusted to take these differences into
consideration. The accuracy of the data therefore depends heavily on
the validity of the adjustments. By contrast, when tax return data is
used no such adjustments are necessary. Thus, an estimate of the revenue
loss associated with a specified increase in the standard deduction would
be quite reliable since the Treasury tax model contains tax return data
concerning the itemized deductions presently claimed in excess of the
standard deduction. However, the revenue effect of a proposal to reduce
the standard deduction would be far more difficult to estimate since no
tax return information currently exists that would permit quantification
of the itemized deductions of individuals who lowered their taxes by
taldng the standard deduction.
A second major factor contributing to the difficulty of achieving
uniform reliability of projections is the inability to determine accurately
how the change will be received by taxpayers. Thus, revenue esti-
mates of the effect of proposals which are likely to induce changes in
patterns of behavior are typically less trustworthy than estimates of
proposed changes which function independently of persons' reactions.
Projections of the revenue effect of changes in the amount of the
personal exemption are extremely sound. Data concerning the present
revenue loss from personal exemptions is readily obtainable from the
Treasury tax model and people are not likely to have additional children,
go blind, or reach age 65 faster because the personal exemption is in-
creased from $750 to $800. In contrast, the estimated revenue effects
from the changes in withholding under the Revenue Act of 1971
proved to be in error by $4-5 billion for calendar year 1972 95-an error
of over 500 percent. In making the projection, estimators had assumed
that people would change their withholding forms to minimize the
95 Compare S. REP. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1971), with Hearings Before
the House Conmdttee on Ways and Means on the Subject of Administration Request for
Increase in Public Debt Ceiling, 92d Cong, 2d Sess., 32 (June, 1972) (Testimony of
George P. Schultz).
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amount withheld by claiming all available withholding allowances. In
effect, those who failed to do so were making an interest-free loan to
the government which is, of course, economically unwise. Nonetheless,
a significant number of people preferred to allow the Government to
overwithhold and refund tax when they filed their return rather than
confront the situation which had existed the previous year when many
persons were underwithheld and were forced to make large tax payments
when they filed their returns. Revenue estimators cannot attempt to
predict such economically irrational behavior. 6
Often these distorting factors operate simultaneously, making accu-
rate projection even more difficult. For example, the concurrence of
reliance on second-best data sources and the difficulty of predicting tax-
payer response to change makes the estimates of revenue which would
be obtained from taxing currently tax-exempt interest on state and local
bonds fairly uncertain. Tax exempt interest is not required to be reported
on individual tax returns and information about individual holdings of
tax-exempt bonds is sketchy. Furthermore, in order to make meaning-
ful projections, interest rates must be estimated and correlated with
individual holdings. 8 Finally, predicting personal and market reactions
to changes in the taxability of state and local obligations is quite difficult.
Nevertheless, it is fairly well accepted dogma that taxing state and local
bond interest without simultaneously providing a direct interest subsidy
would produce approximately $2.2 billion in federal revenue 9 No
allowance is made for the highly conjectural nature of that figure; no
attempt is made to give that estimate less credence than other more
trustworthy projections.
The most difficult revenue estimates are those of proposals to reduce
tax benefits that are available through complex legal arrangements in
specialized areas. For example, it was virtually impossible to estimate
accurately the revenue to be gained by the provision in the 1969 Act
96 Some portion of the overwithholding was due to the manner in which the with-
holding changes were implemented. Many employees were not made aware of the
new rules and thus had inadvertant overwithholding. The Internal Revenue Service did
not require employees to file new withholding forms.
97This is why the Senate Finance Committee in 1969 would have required taxpayers
to disclose their tax-exempt interest on their tax returns. SENqAT Com. oN FiNAcE,
REPoRT To AccosmPAN H.R. 13270 S. RE. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 218-19 (1969).
This provision was not adopted.
o8One additional problem is the age of the basic data. The basic data source is the
Federal Reserve survey taken in 1962. Although this is constantly updated, the basic
source is now rather old.
99 Cohen J.E.C. Statement, supra note 71, Appendix D, at 2.
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which limits the deductibility of interest incurred in certain investment
activities.1 " Much of the interest to be affected by the new provisions
was reflected in tax returns of partnerships and thus was not readily
available from tax return data for individuals. Furthermore, the pro-
vision is extremely technical and complex, applying in different ways
under varying circumstances. While much interest on indebtedness in-
curred prior to the effective date of the new provision was exempted
from its impact, the exemption often depended on the particular cir-
cumstances in which the indebtedness was incurred. Notwithstanding
these difficulties, the interest provision was estimated to produce $20
nillion in revenue and this estimate was in no way distinguished from
perfectly reliable projections such as the revenue loss from the increase
in the personal exemption. Similar examples abound. The revenue loss
from new tax incentives for particular investments such as in pollution
control or job training and child care facilities are extremely difficult
to project. Likewise, estimates of revenue to be gained through increas-
ing the estate tax on generation-skipping trusts are little more than
sophisticated guesses.
Additional factors affect the reliability of revenue estimates. Typi-
cally, estimates are made with the assumption that no other changes in
the law are made at the same time. Thus, if two or more provisions are
changed the impact may be synergistic or may produce less revenue
effect than would the sum when calculated independently.101
10o IN-r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163 (d) [originally enacted as Tax Reform Act of 1969,
§ 221, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Star. 487 (1969)1. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM Acr, supra note 19, at 20.
101 Two elements of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system, as originally pro-
posed, illustrate this point. The new first-year convention was expected to lose $1.8
billion in revenue in 1971 and the ability to use depreciation lives up to 20 percent
shorter than the guideline lives was estimated to cost $700 million of revenue for 1971.
Together, they were estimated to cost $2.8 billion in 1971. By 1978, the process was
expected to reverse. The first-year convention was estimated to cost $800 million and the
20 percent shortening of lives, $3.9 billion, but the total loss estimated for 1978 was only
$3.9 billion.
I In cases such as these, other technical difficulties may have a profound influence on
the reliability of revenue estimates. For example, the order in which two or more pro-
posals are considered often has a dramatic impact on the predicted revenue effect.
Consider a proposal to increase the maximuri standard deduction, which under present
law is 15 percent of adjusted gross income'with a $2,000 ceiling, to 20 percent with a
$5,000 ceiling. Calculating the rate and ceiling changes independently will produce the
following estimates: raising the ceiling to $5,000 without increasing the 15 percent rate
would cost $1.3 billion; raising the rate to 20 percent without increasing the ceiling
would cost $1.0 billion. Raising the rate to 20 percent and the ceiling to $5,000 would be
estimated to cost $4.7 billion. If ybu treat thechange in rate as coming first, it would
t1420 [Vol. 58:1389
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Estimates are ordinarily "first-level"; no projection is made of sec-
ondary or "feedback" effects of the change in economic activity which
may result from the tax change. Estimates of these effects often vary
greatly among economists. When Treasury proposed the new ADR
system of depreciation, one economist testified that no revenue feedback
would occur; another testified that the revenue feedback would be so
great as to translate an annual "first-level" revenue loss of almost $4
billion into an annual $2 billion revenue gain.' 02
Finally, the length of time available to make the estimate may affect
its reliability. Congress often calls for instantaneous predictions of the
effects of complex changes. Certainly many of these estimates could be
improved if more time were available.0
be estimated to cost $1.0 billion with $3.7 billion attributed to raising the ceiling. By treat-
ing the increase in the ceiling as coming first, one would estimate a $1.3 billion loss from
that change with the rate change estimated to lose $3.4 billion. By changing the order
in which estimates are made, policy makers can dramatically affect the revenue estimates
attributed to particular changes in the law. Many estimates are interdependent. For ex-
ample, revenue estimates from changes in particular itemized deductions, such as elimi-
nating the deduction for home mortgage interest, depend upon changes in other itemized
deductions and in the standard deduction. And the revenue effect of changes in per-
centage depletion are dependent on what change, if any, is made in the treatment of
intangible drilling expenses.
1o2 See note 7, supra.
103 For at least the past 20 years, estimators have been subject to tremendous pressure
from legislators who demand that estimates be produced quickly. For a discussion of
this problem, see R. BLOUGH, supra note 12, at 298-99.
The uncertainties of hastily derived revenue estimates is well illustrated by the de-
liberations on Senator Miller's amendment to the minimum tax provision in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. Senator Miller's amendment substantially altered the Senate
Finance Committee bill, increasing the minimum tax rate from five to ten percent and
allowing taxes paid under the regular income tax to be deducted from the total prefer-
ences in determining the preferences to which the ten percent rate would be applied. The
Senator defended these amendments, in part, on the grounds that they would produce
$40,000,000 more in revenues than the Senate Finance Committee bill. The amendment
easily carried the Senate. 115 CoNG. R~c. S. 16371-74, S. 16387-90 (daily ed. Dec. 10,
1969). The Miller amendments remained substantially intact in the conference committee
report and were enacted into law. Later, when the Reform Act was sent to the Presi-
dent, the Joint Committee staff published final revenue estimates which predicted that
the Miller-amended minimum tax provision would produce $20,000,000 less than the
Senate Finance Committee version. ST.%rA OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTrNAL REVENUE
TAXATION, 91sT CONG, 1sT SEss, REVENuE EsTiMATEs RELATING TO THE HousE, SENATE
AND CONFERENcE VERSIONS OF H.R. 13270-TAx REFOr m AcT OF 1969, at 9 (Comm. Print
1969).
The history of sections 452 and 462, which were originally enacted as part of the 1954
Code but repealed retroactively in 1955, illustrates how disasterous uncritical reliance
on estimates can be. In the case of those sections, it became clear only after enactment
that the estimate was extremely conservative and that immense revenue losses Were
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The myriad of factors and assumptions that can affect reliability
mandates a qualitative distinction of revenue estimates. But Treasury
and the congressional committees typically do not attempt to classify
estimates by reliability. Reliable and unreliable estimates are added to-
gether, and substantive tax decisions are routinely based on the totals.
Since revenue estimates are frequently dispositive of issues, they should
be used more carefully. Congressmen should inquire into the methodol-
ogy of estimates, not to master the techniques of revenue estimating but
to evaluate the reliability of the estimates that are important to their
decisions. Treasury and committee staffs should supply a range of
revenue estimates. For example, it is better to know that a given proposal
is estimated to produce $200-500 million of revenue than to be given
a single $350 million estimate. Not only would such a figure be more
accurate, the breadth of the range may provide insight into the re-
liability of the estimate. Finally, Congress should consider establishing
categories for revenue estimates depending on their potential accuracy,
and should require the Treasury and the Joint Committee staff to identify
which category estimate it is supplying 04 The Treasury and the con-
gressional committees should spare no effort to make their use of revenue
estimates more intelligent, more thoughtful, and more rational. Their
impact at every stage of the process is far too crucial for the present
practice to continue.
Who Speaks for the Public Interest?
Improving the information presented to Congress by Treasury and
the Joint Committee staff will not ensure that the committees receive the
most complete information possible. These bodies are not omniscient on
tax questions. Moreover, although the Treasury Department and the
Joint Committee staff traditionally have represented the public interest,
political factors limit their options before Congress and sometimes render
unfettered objective presentation impossible.' 0 5 Perhaps the best that can
almost certain to result. For a full discussion of these sections, see New York Commission
on Tax Policy, supra note 8, at 342-43.
1041t should be noted that because of the collaboration, in arriving at an estimate,
between revenue estimators on the Treasury staff and estimators on the Joint Committee
staff, the check of each staff on the work of the other is vitiated. In effect, only one
estimate is produced. This is necessitated in part because of Congress' lack of access to
a computer. This absence of computer facilities hampers Congress' ability to deal inde-
pendently with many issues of tax policy and budget-making.
105 See text accompanying notes 60-62, supra.
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be hoped is that the political influences do not affect the two on the
same issues.
The Treasury Department recently testified about the federal tax
structure before the Joint Economic Committee, presenting information
concerning the distribution of benefits from "tax preferences" among
different income classes.10 6 The Tax Reform Research Group, an or-
ganization created in 1970 by Ralph Nader, suggested that the data
would be more indicative of the distribution of tax preferences if it in-
cluded information about the number of taxpayers in each income
class.'0 7 For example, Treasury had indicated that the $10,000-$15,000
class received $719 million in deductions for interest paid on mortgages
on owner-occupied homes, while the wealthiest group, those with in-
comes over $100,000, received $32 million. The Nader group supple-
mented this information by showing that the average benefits from the
provision were $50.97 to a taxpayer in the middle-income group and
$410.78 to a taxpayer for the highest income class.' 08 Such additional
perspectives, the inevitable result of increased public participation in the
information-gathering process, would offer the legislators substantial
assistance in understanding the complex questions they must resolve.
If congressional decision-making is to be both intelligent and sensitive
to the needs of the various sectors of the American populace, added in-
puts from the public interest sector are imperative. Wilbur Mills has
voiced this sentiment:
The government comes at us from one side with its bills, the high
income brackets come at us from the other side with their lawyers
and consultants. What the average taxpayers need is a lobby of their
own.
1 09
106 Cohen J.E.C. Statement, supra note 71, at Appendix E.
107 N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 20, col. 1. Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1972, at 2, col. 6.
108 Other data might be relevant here. Decision-makers might be interested in statistics
showing the monetary benefits as a percentage of the total tax obligation of the respec-
tive tax groupings. Similarly, a study might be made illustrating the aggregate income
exclusions and deductions rather than just the tax loss. The essential point is not to down-
grade the usefulness of the figures presented but rather to demonstrate that new per-
spectives flowing from increased public presentation in the information-gathering pro-
cess will almost certainly contribute to improved understanding by the committee
members. However, by making unsupported charges that the Treasury data was "de-
liberately misleading," the Nader Group called into question its own objective status
and thus diminished its effectiveness as a spokesman for the public interest. For a state-
ment of the charges made by the Nader group, see Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1972,
at 2, col. 5. Similar charges have been made by this group in the past.
109 Wilbur Mills, quoted in Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1969.
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Typically, Treasury's public testimony is followed by a parade of
witnesses representing particular financial interests. In the 1969 public
hearings on tax reform, the tax-writing committees heard witnesses sup-
porting the favored tax treatment of farms, investments in real estate,
and natural resources; persons from churches and universities concerned
with possible reductions in tax-deductible charitable contributions; and
representatives of state and local governments threatened by possible
loss of tax-exemptions for interest on state and local bonds." 0 Of the
267 witnesses who testified during the three weeks of Senate hearings
on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, over 225 or 84 percent represented
particular industries or groups with a financial stake in the committee's
decisions."' The few public spirited witnesses who had no pecuniary
interest at stake fell into four general categories: members of Congress,
academicians, representatives of bar and accountants' associations, and
representatives of "public interest" organizations., 2 A measure described
in the report of the Ways and Means Committee as a tax reform bill
unsurpassed in substantive scope" 3 inspired testimony before the Senate
Finance Committee of only eighteen members of Congress; seven aca-
demicians; representatives from one bar association; representatives from
one association of accountants; and twelve "public interest" organiza-
tions.114
A more detailed examination of testimony before the Senate Finance
Committee hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on behalf of the
public interest is revealing. Of the eighteen members of Congress who
testified before the committee, seven spoke primarily about the impact
11OSee Hearings on HR. 13270 Before Sen. Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Sen. Finance Coimm. Hearings]; Hearings on HR.
13270 Before House Ways and Means Comm., 91st Gong, 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 House Ways and Means Comm. Hearings].
"'l 1969 Sen. Finance Comm. Hearings, supra, note 110.
112 There is no simple way to categorize testimony as representing public or private
interests. For the purposes of this Article, private interest testimony is defined a5
testimony given by a witness who has a direct personal financial interest, or who
represents an organization which has a direct financial interest in the legislation. There
are obvious problems with such a definition, because every citizen has some immediate'
interest in tax legislation.
11 House COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT TO AccO mPANY H.R. 13270, H.R.
No. 91-413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969). The opening paragraph reads as follows:
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 (H.R. 13270) represents a substantive and com-
prehensive reform of the income tax laws. Your committee is not aware of any
prior tax reform bill of equal substantive scope.
1141969 Sen. Finance Comm.'Hearings, supra note 110. Twenty-three Congressmen
testified but five merely introduced other witnesses and gave no personal testimony. Id.
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of proposals on industries that were essential to the economy of their
states. 15 Although in some instances this testimony added little new in-
formation to the arguments proposed by industry lobbyists, it did lend
support to the industry statements. Thus, while limited in scope, the
testimony of these seven Congressmen, was valuable to the committee.
The remaining eleven Congressmen dealt with some of the broader
issues of the 1969 Act-the need for tax reform, for simplicity in the tax
laws, and for tax relief. Several of the congressional witnesses entered
into the record prepared statements which examined particular problems
with varying degrees of sophistication. Other more general testimony,
while perhaps not helping the committees cut through the legal and
economic complexities of the legislation, provided an effective and occa-
sionally elloquent articulation of popular views on taxation.
A number of elected state officials testified. In most cases, their testi-
mony was solely to oppose any alteration in the tax exempt status of
municipal bonds. Nine mayors and seven governors presented argu-
ments to the committee on the bond issue; none dealt with any other
questions of public policy crucial to the Tax Reform Act of 1969. An
unusual opportunity for gathering testimony on the public interest was
thus lost. These public officials, coming from as far as California and
Hawaii, had invested a considerable amount of time, energy, and public
funds to travel to Washington. Yet, as lobbyists, they only addressed
the tax-exempt bond issue.
The academicians' input into the tax legislative process is of crucial
importance. Admittedly, academic experts have their political leanings
and even an occasional axe to grind. Nevertheless, academics provide an
important source of objective, informed opinion on taxation problems.
In the Senate Finance Committee hearings on the 1969 Tax Reform Act,
four economics professors testified. Four law professors spoke, a dis-
appointing if not astounding turnout. The Directory of the Association
of American Law Schools lists over 500 teachers who specialize in fed-
eral income taxation; thus, less than one percent of those academics
possessing legal expertise in the field testified. Of the several law schools
in the immediate District of Columbia area only the University of Mary -
land was represented.
This sparse representation from the teaching end of the legal profes-
sion might be offset somewhat by more active participation of the prac-
115 See, e.g, testimony of Colorado Senator Gordon Allot, 1969 Sen. Finance Comm.




ticing bar. The American Bar Association's Section on Taxation, how-
ever, limits its testimony to three aspects of tax legislation: problems of
statutory draftsmanship, unnecessary complexity, and alternative means
of accomplishing general objectives.11 While these are extremely im-
portant points, more complete testimony is sorely needed. Ways must
be developed to fill the present gap in knowledgeable testimony of tax
practicioners on the substantive issues. The practicing bar must fill the
void that the ABA has left. The effect of the lack of testimony of un-
affiliated tax practicioners, coupled with the lack of participation of tax
experts from the law schools, makes it difficult for the committees to
obtain objective legal opinion from the public. Under the present pro-
cedures, the committees are all too often exposed to effective argumen-
tation from only one perspective.
Since 1969 a few new public spirited groups concerned with tax policy
have been formed.1 These groups have attempted to redress the balance
so heavily weighted in favor of private pecuniary interests. While they
have had a substantial impact,11 8 one need only point to the sparcity of
public interest testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on the
Revenue Act of 1971, a bill designed to implement the President's new
fiscal policy by granting about $18 billion in tax relief, to see that the
balance has not shifted.119 This showing is somewhat surprising, es-
pecially since the nature of the tax relief contained in the President's
1971 recommendations was highly controversial. The central issue, the
division of the tax relief between business and individual taxpayers,
18 Testimony of Scott F. Crampton, Chairman, American Bar Association Section on
Taxation, 1969 Sen. Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 110, at 5146.
117 Taxation with Representation and Ralph Nader's Tax Reform Research Group are
examples.
118 The following observation appeared in The Kiplinger Tax Letter, April 21, 1972:
Public interest groups also have been a surprise. It used to be that lobbyists
represented special interests, Treasury represented public. Now citizen lobbies
are stepping in, supported by small individual gifts. They claim that they speak
for the average person [and] the general welfare. It's easy to dismiss them, to scoff.
But remember Ralph Nader's rise, and his current influence. And remember that
one of the lobbies is his.
Id. at 1.
119 Only eleven members of Congress testified-about half the number in 1969. There
were nine academicians, an increase of one over 1969. The bar association and certified
public accountants failed to testify. Sixteen individuals representing public interest or-
ganizations appeared, four of which are included among the academicians testifying.
Of these sixteen public interest witnesses, the testimony of five was sponsored by
Taxation with Representation, a new public interest organization. The special interests
were again well represented with over thirty-eight witnesses. Hearings on 1971 Revenue
Act Before Senate Finance Comm., 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)..
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generated considerable debate. One element of the House bill, the new
Asset Depreciation Range system, was hotly contested since its incep-
tion in January, 1971.120 This review indicates that even at the public
hearing stage those representing private interests vastly outnumber
those attempting to represent the public interest. And this is the last
time that most persons representing the public interest will be heard
while the lobbyists for the private interests will continue to urge Con-
gressmen to adopt their position until the bill's passage. After the public
hearing stage, the public must totally rely on the members of Congress,
the Treasury, and the congressional staffs to present its case.
The public must be made better aware of the major economic and
social issues that are constantly being resolved through the tax system.
The public hearings should be modified to provide a forum for more
meaningful discussion of the issues, and other sources of public interest
testimony must be found. For example, present law prohibits charitable
organizations from testifying before congressional committees. The
Ways and Means Committee recently held hearings on a bill to permit
such testimony.12 1 Passage of legislation of this type would provide the
Congress a valuable new source of information. Additionally, Congress
must find some method to reduce academic ennui. The Joint Economic
Committee has achieved greater participation of academicians by inviting
selected witnesses to testify in public hearings. 22 If invitations to public
hearings will produce testimony from academicians when announce-
ments of public hearings will not, the tax writing committees should
certainly extend such invitations.
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Increased public participation in the tax legislative process coupled
with revision of the public hearing forums and the suggested improve-
ments in the information supplied by the Treasury and the Joint Com-
mittee staff will go far toward improving the information-gathering-
process. But this is only half of the battle. We must also ensure that the-
120 The proposed ADR regulations provoked written comments to the Treasury from,
more than 150 individuals, corporations, and associations, and 50 witnesses testified at
Treasury's public hearing. ADR PAMHLET, supra note 7, at 6, n.2.
121 Hearings on Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizationw
Before the House Coymn.'on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). In its testi-
mony, the Treasury Department supported the idea of allowing charitable organizations
to testify.
122 See, e.g., Hearings on the Value-Added Tax Before the Joint Economic Comm.,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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process for translating information and judgments into law functions as
efficiently as possible.
Executive Sessions
The Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees' informal delib-
erations in executive session comprise the heart of their consideration of
tax bills.'23 The public is excluded from these sessions. Present are the
Treasury to state the Administration position and answer questions, and
the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to pro-
vide information and analysis. Ordinarily, each member of the com-
mittee is free to question the Treasury and the Joint Committee staff at
length on any relevant matter, and the Congressmen generally take
advantage of this opportunity.124
The informal nature of executive sessions renders precise description
impossible; a given session will be a mixture of debate, negotiation, and
compromise. However, the committee chairman has the power to set
the tone for the executive sessions by virtue of his procedural control.
The House Ways and Means Committee, chaired by Wilbur Mills,
rarely takes a vote in executive session until an issue has been fully ex-
plored. Often during the deliberations, the Treasury and the Joint Com-
mittee staff are asked to investigate several approaches to a problem and
suggest new alternatives. Typically, from this deliberative process a con-
sensus will emerge and the committee will often be virtually unanimous
in supporting the ultimate solution which has resulted from negotiation
and compromise. The members' votes on specific issues are rarely needed
and rarely taken.
The Senate Finance Committee, under the leadership of Russell Long,
makes decisions quite differently. The Finance Committee has the bene-
fit of starting with a copy of the House bill which it reviews section by
section. Consequently, in its executive sessions the Finance Committee
can deal with specifics at an earlier stage than the Ways and Means Com-
mittee. In most cases it considers an issue at length and votes at the end
of its deliberation. In some cases, however, votes begin with the first
1 23 Woodworth, supra note 29, at 407.
124 Time for debating tax bills, however, is limited. In 1969, the House Ways and
Means Committee met in executive sessions, usually held both morning and afternoon,
for over three months to consider the Tax Reform Act. But time pressures allowed the
Senate Finance Committee only three weeks to deliberate this massive bill in executive
session. Committee members recently have urged that their personal staffs be admitted
to the, executive sessions. This would certainly enable the Senators and Representatives
to deal more effectively with the issues. But see Woodworth,.supra note 29, at 408-09.
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discussion of the issue and the chairman considers all votes tentative
until the final vote to report the bill is taken. Thus, the same issue is
sometimes voted on many times during the consideration of a bill.
During its three weeks of executive session on the Tax Reform Act of
1969 the Finance Committee took over three hundred votes. Former
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Stanley Surrey distinguished the
decision-making processes of the Ways and Means and Finance Commit-
tees in the following terms: "What emerges from Ways and Means is
a committee result; what emerges from Finance is a composite of per-
sonal results."'125
Decisions in both committees are often the results of compromises in
which the committee chairman and the ranking minority member play
important roles. The Treasury, as the President's chief spokesman, can
be highly effective in presenting the Administration's position. On issues
of great importance to the Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury
will often be present in the executive sessions; other times Treasury is
represented by the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary, or the As-
sistant Secretary for Tax Policy. In addition, the committees rely heavily
on the analysis and advice of the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation.
Seldom do the votes in either committee follow party lines; the
members generally have more personalized opinions on the issues. On
occasion, however, a fairly clear party split is discernible. For example,
in 1969 the question whether tax relief should be accomplished by in-
creasing the personal exemption resulted in a party division, largely
because the issue became a political vehicle in a Democratic Senator's
reelection campaign. 12 In 1971, Republicans and Democrats divided
over the distribution of tax relief between individuals and business tax-
payers, but the votes on this issue in the committees and on the floors
of Congress represented philosophical as well as party differences.
Publicizing the joint Committee Pamphlets
The committees' consideration of the issues in the executive ses-
sions are to a large extent directed by the pamphlets prepared by the
Joint Committee staff. Typically, the pamphlets organize the consid-
eration of the subject, describe the position taken by the Treasury
125 Stanley S. Surrey, quoted in Rosen, Will These Men Raise Taxes?, Dtm's, Septem-
ber 1972, at 48.
126 Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee led the battle to raise the personal exemption.
He was defeated by William Brock in the 1970 elections.
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and other important witnesses during the public hearings, and offer
the Joint Committee staff's analysis of various measures under consid-
ration.'27 The pamphlets sometimes contain the recommendations of the
Joint Committee staff. One hundred and twelve pamphlets were prepared
and used by the committees during the consideration of the 1969 Tax
Reform Act.' 28 Executive sessions often begin with the chairman asking
the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee to review the pamphlet with
the committee. The documents are considered "confidential committee
prints" and are not made available to the public.
The Joint Committee staff pamphlets provide an extremely important
source of information and analysis for the committees. Through them,
the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee directs, insofar as is possible,
the committees' consideration of issues. Often the alternatives and op-
tions set forth in the pamphlet provide a complete listing of the alterna-
tives considered in the executive sessions. As any lawyer recognizes, the
ability to state the issues and present alternatives frequently provides the
opportunity to guide the ultimate resolution of issues. The committees
give great weight to recommendations of the Joint Committee staff.
It is surprising that a document so central to legislative resolution of
the issues is never made public. Through its testimony at the public hear-
ings, the Treasury's position becomes known. But the position of the staff
of the Joint Committee, which may be accorded greater weight by the
congressional committees, is forever free from public scrutiny and eval-
uation. Indeed, even many Congressmen may be unaware of the revela-
tions contained in the pamphlets. Admittedly, secrecy plays an important
role in some of the deliberative processes of Congress. Although the
executive sessions now leave a large gap in the legislative history of a tax
provision, the reason for excluding the public from the meetings seems
sound. Candid discussion of the issues would undoubtedly be tempered
by public attendance. The same rationale is not as persuasive, however,
when applied to the Joint Committee staff pamphlets. No committee
deliberations would be disclosed by their publication, and a number of
positive benefits might flow from opening the documents to public
scrutiny.
If the committees should determine that it is practical to publish the
pamphlets sufficiently in advance of the executive sessions, they could
-thereby create an additional input into the establishment of the parame-
127 Woodworth, supra note 29, at 407.
128 Id.
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ters of their considerations. Furthermore, even if pre-executive session
dissemination of the pamphlets and consideration of suggested alterna-
tives is not considered feasible, their subsequent release would supple-
ment the legislative history of the proposals and thereby increase public
awareness of the issues. The pamphlets often form the basis of the com-
mittee reports which have become an increasingly important source of
legislative history. Moreover, the pamphlets provide additional informa-
tion about the alternatives considered and rejected by the congressional
committees. Thus, they could provide valuable insights into the com-
mittees' intentions in adopting measures 29 and thereby help tax practi-
tioners and the courts apply the law properly.130
Promoting Simplification of the Tax Laws
Generally the members of the committees concern themselves only
with the broad parameters of the policy decisions, leaving many ques-
tions unanswered until resolved by the staffs during the drafting of the
statute. 3' Actual drafting of the statutory language is done by the staff
of the House or Senate Legislative Counsel in consultation with the com-
mittee staffs and the staffs of the Treasury and the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation. The Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee is
usually the final arbiter of the policy decisions that go into drafting the
statute, but Treasury's views are given considerable weight, particularly
129 For cases inustrating the use of legislative history in the interpretation of tax laws,
see United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Fribourgh Navigation Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966); Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
Occasionally the press comments directly on the nature of these pamphlets. For ex-
ample, in 1969 the Wall Street Journal reported a proposal for the taxation of mutual
savings banks, and stated in part:
Committee sources said the proposal on mutual savings banks, which was made
to Congress by the Treasury Department under President Johnson and was sub-
sequently endorsed in a confidential report to the Ways and Means panel from an
influential Congressional staff group, is still open to discussion, with an uncertain
outcome.
Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1969, at 3, col. I (emphasis added).
130 Although publication of the Joint Committee staff's pamphlets might not disclose
the actual deliberations of the congressional committees, release of the information might
not be entirely free of cost. Public disclosure of the pamphlets might jeopardize the
Joint Committee staff's relationship with the congressional committees. The possibility
of damaging this relationship seems particularly acute in the case of publication of the
staff's recommendations; release of the analysis and the alternatives considered by the
committees would appear to present less of a threat. In light of this possibility, the
Joint Committee staff might release only the analysis and the alternatives it suggested
for committee consideration.
131 See Woodworth supra note 29, at 407.
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when Administration proposals have been accepted by the congressional,
committee. Only in extremely rare cases is the statutory language re-
viewed by the members of the committees. As a general rule, major pol-
icy decisions which are made by the staff during the bill's drafting are
reported to the committee in general terms. When very complicated or.,
technical matters are involved, the committees may never be made aware
of the staff decisions.13 2
The intricate nature of tax legislation seems to necessitate the dele-
gation of immense authority to the staffs. The congressional tax staffs
are extraordinarily able and the committees have great confidence in
their abilities. Little would be gained if committee members devoted
their time to the task of reviewing complicated statutory drafts. None-
theless, the present system has produced tax laws that are unbelievably
complex. More than twenty years ago, Judge Learned Hand expressed
his frustration with the complexity of our tax laws:
In my ,own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched
in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave in my
mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully
concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is with-
in my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of
time. I know that these monsters are the result of fabulous industry
and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting out that net, against
all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of
William James about certain passages of Hegel: that they were no
doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help
wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that
the words are strung together with syntactical correctness. 33
This pattern has continued to the present. A favorite of tax practitioners
is the following paragraph added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1969:
For purposes of paragraph (3), an organization described in para-
graph (2) shall be deemed to include an organization described in
132The committee report sets forth pertinent economic and statistical data, summarizes
the nature and background of the problems and the reasons for the committee's decision,
and often contains a technical analysis of the various provisions of the bill. It is generally
drafted by the staff of the Joint Committee in consultation with the Treasury staff.
133L. HAND, THE Spinu op LmERTry 213 (Dilliard ed. 1952). This sentiment was also
voiced by Albert Einstein who stated that the federal income tax is the hardest thing
in the world to understand. Completing his own return, Einstein reputedly remarked,
"This is too difficult for a mathematician, it takes a philosopher."
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section 501(c) (4), (5), or (6) which would be described in paragraph
(2) if it were an organization described in section 501(c) (3).134
Often, tax provisions applicable to large numbers of low and middle
income taxpayers become so overwhelmingly complex that they are
impotent in accomplishing their intended purpose. 35 Thus, every call
for tax reform has stressed the need for simplification of the tax laws.130
184 INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 509(a). The following observations was quoted in
Busnuzss WEEK, Nov. 28, 1970, at 51:
Says C. Lowell Harriss, a Columbia University economist: 'An impression of
stupefying complexity will strike anyone picking up the law; the impression will
remain after hours or days of study.' Some sections of the Internal Revenue Code
have been described as 'boldly meaningless,' by tax expert Allen D. Choka, in an
article titled The Sheer Hell of the Internal Revenue Code in The American Bar
Assn. Journal.185 For example, in 1971, Congress liberalized the deductions allowable for expenses
for child care or domestice services which are incurred to enable a taxpayer to be
gainfully employed. Revenue Act of 1971, § 210 (a), Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497
(1971). The provision was intended to aid working mothers who argued that the ex-
penses of hiring a babysitter should be just as deductible as John Paul Getty's expenses
of hiring a secretary.
This seems to be a simple and worthwhile objective, until one examines the details.
First, to obtain any deduction, the taxpayer must qualify as a head of a household
which includes a child under age fifteen, or a disabled spouse, or any dependent who
is incapable of caring for himself. No deduction is allowed for a married taxpayer unless
-he files a joint return and his spouse is physically or mentally incapable of caring for
herself or is gainfully employed on a substantially full time basis (at least 30 hours per
week for a substantial part of the month in question). There are rules defining who is
married and who is single, which determine marital status on a monthly, rather than a
yearly basis. The deduction cannot exceed $4,800 per year-or more accurately, the
deduction for "employment-related" expenses is allowed only to the extent such ex-
penses incurred-not paid-do not exceed $400 per month. Thus, the Code provides for
an accrual accounting concept available on a monthly basis to cash basis taxpayers.
In general, an employment related expense must be incurred for services in the tax-
payer's household, except that in the case of a child under fifteen, $200 of the $400
per month may be incurred for care outside the home, $300 in the case of two children
and $400 in the case of three or more children. Next the deduction is phased-out at the
rate of 50 cents every $1.00 by which the taxpayer's (and his spouse's) adjusted gross
income exceeds $18,000 (for the year in which the expense is incurred-not the year
in which the expense is paid). Thus, to know on April 15, 1974, if $75 paid to a baby-
sitter on January 1, 1973, for services rendered during the last week of December 1972
are deductible, a taxpayer must know his adjusted gross income for 1972; he must then
divide that amount by 12 to determine the part of adjusted gross income applicable to
December 1972. The taxpayer will also have to know his marital status in December
of 1972, whether the wife was disabled or working full time, and whether a qualifying
individual was a part of his household. Finally, the deduction is only available to tax-
payers who itemize their deductions. Imagine a person wading through all these rules
and computations only to conclude that he would save more tax by taking the standard
deduction. Provisions such as these have sent many taxpayers to H&R Block and other
tax return services.
136 See e.g, Hearings Before the Special Senate Comm. on Aging, S. Rep. No. 91-1464,
Virginia Law Review[
If Congress is to attain the elusive goal of simplification of the tax
laws in the next round of reform, at a minimum the committee members
must be more attentive to the intricacies of their broad policy decisions.
Tax provisions reflect a multitude of objectives and accommodations
of numerous points of view. Translation of broad and complex decisions
of tax policy into specific provisions of the tax law is therefore an ex-
ceedingly complex task, one presently made more difficult by the com-
mittees' failure to consider whether their desires can be hammered into
comprehensible statutory provisions. Thus, if simplification is to be
achieved in the 1973 tax reform effort, the committee members must
make sure that the compromises that they strike among the conflicting
views of the members of Congress, the Administration, and the staffs do
not produce results that the statutory drafters cannot shape into intelli-
gible law. They must exercise restraint in hastily adopting provisions
before the staff has thoroughly studied the proposal. Finally, the com-
mittee must constrain staff exuberancy that is sometimes manifested by
a desire to draft a statute covering every possible mutation of a particular
transaction.
Perhaps one way in which the committee members could help to as-
sure that their decisions can be translated into intelligible legislation is
to require that the staffs produce a sample tax form and instructions
implementing their proposals. In this manner, the committee members
could review in detail their decisions without expending undue amounts
of their time and without having to personally grapple with the intri-
cacies of statutory drafts. 37 All decisions could remain tentative until
the committee reviewed the sample form and instructions.138 Since the
tax form is the medium through which most individuals must face the
complexities of the law, the standard of review could be a simple one:
The committee members should assume that if they cannot comprehend
the details of their decisions as reflected in the tax form, neither can the
American public. To do less is to abandon all hope for simplifying our
nation's tax laws.
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (containing a discussion of the inability of elderly persons to
comprehend and utilize complex tax provisions intended for their benefit).
137 The Committes could call on tax form specialists from the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice to assist in the drafting of these forms.
138 Obviously the demands of time would prevent the committes from demanding a
final version of the tax form. At best, it would be an initial draft which would be refined
after enactment of the legislation. However, even this "rough draft" of the tax form
would provide the legislators a valuable opportunity to get some feeling for the practical
difficulty of drafting forms to express intelligibly some of their policy decisions.
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Floor Debate in the House and Senate-Open versus Closed Rules
Probably the most controversial stage of the tax legislative process is
the procedure under which tax bills are debated on the floor of the
House of Representatives. Usually, bills are considered under a "closed
rule" which requires the House to accept or reject the entire measure;
debate is limited and generally no amendments are permitted.39 In con-
trast, the Senate permits unlimited debate and any Senator can amend
tax bills. Provisions of the Senate Finance Committee's bills can be
deleted or modified and Senators can add new provisions on the floor.
The variance in the House and Senate rules creates a markedly differ-
ent form of debate of tax bills on the floors of the two houses of Con-
gress. As a result of the closed rule, debate in the House is usually brief.
The Revenue Act of 1971 was debated for only one hour and thirty
minutes' 40 and, in 1969 the 368-page Ways and Means Committee ver-
sion of the Tax Reform Act was debated for only six hours.14' In con-
trast, the Senate debated the Tax Reform Act for thirteen days. Senators
proposed 111 amendments, of which 70 were included in the Senate's
version of the bill.142
Many of those who would reform the tax laws consider the House's
closed rule, a subject of condemnation for over twenty years, 43 a great
obstacle to reform. The New York Times has complained that the closed
rule renders impotent the 410 members of the House who are not on
the Ways and Means Committee.144 Echoing this sentiment, Albert Tur-
kus of Nader's Research Group stated, "Under the present procedure less
than 12 million of the nation's 200 million citizens have a meaningful
voice in the tax laws that are passed."'145 Both the Times and Nader's
group have praised the Senate for the quality of its floor debate and
amendments. 46
In this author's opinion, total chaos would result if a major tax bill
were ever allowed to be considered on the floor of the House under an
189 See note 28, supra.
140 117 CoNG. REc. H 9157 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971).
14 115 CONG. REC. 22, 562 (1969).
142 J. PEcHMA ", supra note 12, at 43.
143 R. BLOUGH, supra note 12, at 77.
144 N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, at 46, col. 1.
145 Married Single Hearings, supra note 9 at 65. The actual import of Mr. Turkus'
statement is not clear in light of the fact that the number of registered voters more
closely approaches 100 million rather than 200 million. See also Stanton, Taxes: Reform
or Revolt?, Tim NFw REPULIC, April 15, 1972, at 19,20 [hereinafter cited at Stanton].
146 See generally notes 144 and 145 supra. See also J. PECHMAN, supra note 12, at 42-43.
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open rule permitting unlimited amendments and debate. Representative
O'Neill aptly pictured the problems that would result from House
adoption of this practice, during the floor debate over the closed rule in
,1969:
[I]f we ever have an open rule on this bill you will be here not only
until Christmas but the year after Christmas, and probably beyond.
This bill would never be enacted.
Furthermore, we would be deluged with vans bringing in all the
lobbyists from all over the United States who were working on this
legislation. 147
To recognize the validity of this position one need only reflect upon
the "diligent and deliberate 148 work which took place on the Senate
floor in 1969 and 1971.
In 1971, the President attempted to stimulate a lagging economy by
proposing tax reductions estimated to total $18.8 billion in the fiscal
years 1972, 1973, and 1974. The House bill and the Senate Finance
Committee bill provided tax reductions totalling $17 billion 149 and $17.2
billion 50 respectively for this three year period, and the bill as finally
enacted will reduce revenues by $17.4 billion. But the bill as it passed the
Senate-burdened with the Senate floor amendments-would have re-
duced receipts during this same period not by $17 or $18 billion but by
$32.6 billion."1 The most costly amendments were conceived and sup-
ported by Senators who have been most vocal in urging massive expendi-
tures to redress pressing social needs. What were some of these amend-
ments adopted by the Senate?
-A floor amendment to increase the personal exemption from $750
to $800 annually. This would have -cost the government nearly $2 bil-
lion annually, 152 but how can you tell your constituents that you voted
against increasing the personal exemption by the paltry sum of $50?
147 115 CONG. REc. 22554 (1969). The closed rule was approved by a 264 to 145 vote.
Id. at 22561.
148 N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, at 46, col. 1.
149 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMm. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 92N CONG., isT S-ss.,
SUMMARY OF SENATE AMENDmENTS TO H.R. .10947 THE REvENUE AcT OF 1971 27 (Comm.
Print 1971 [hereinafter cited as JonTr CoMm. SuMMARYI].
150 SENATE CoMr. ON FINANcE, REPORT ON THE REvENuE Ac OF 1971, S. REP. No.
92-437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1971).
15 1 JoINr COMM. SUMMmY, supra note 149, at 26.
15 2 See id. at 5.
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-A 10 percent credit for investments creating jobs in the country
and a 10 percent credit for investments creating jobs in the city, costing
an additional $750 milion 3 -only the suburbs were omitted.
-A credit of up to $325 for the expenses of higher education at an
annual revenue cost of $2.2 billion. " 4
-A credit for property taxes of persons 65 or older, costing $225
million annually.155
Each of these amendments was rejected by the conference committee
and thus did not appear in the final bill.
The Senate also added on the floor an additional personal exemption
for the disabled, who have long argued that they are entitled to the
same extra personal exemption that the blind and the elderly receive
under present law. The Senate had twice added a similar additional per-
sonal exemption in recent years, and on both occasions the conference
committee rejected the proposal. Surely Senators voting for this amend-
ment in 1971 had little expectation that it would actually become law.
Nonetheless, it is far easier for a Senator to tell a disabled constituent
that he supported this amendment and the conference subsequently
threw it out than to say that the additional exemption for the blind is
nonsensical and that there is no point in adding more nonsense to that
already enshrined in the tax laws.
The Senate floor action in 1971 was not atypical. In 1969, the House
version of the Tax Reform Act would have produced a revenue gain of
$2.5 billion during the three-year period 1970 to 1972; the Senate bill
would have lost $8.2 billion over the same period." In the long run,
after all of the provisions would have been phased into complete effec-
tiveness, the Senate bill would have produced a loss exceeding the
losses in the House version by over $3 billion annually.'5 7 These
differences are not simply the product, as many might expect, of the
Senate's greater generosity in providing tax relief. The Senate was also
a far less aggressive tax reformer than the House. During the years
1970, 1971, and 1972, the tax reform provisions of the House bill would
15 Id. at 4.
154 Id. at 9.
'
55 1d. at 9-10.
156 STAFF OF THE JoINT Commzv. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATIoN, 91st CoNG., 1sT SEss.,
SUMMARY OF SENATE A NDmENrS To H.R. 13270 TAx REFoRm AcT OF 1969 pt. 1 at 118
(Preliminary Comm. Print 1969).
157 The House bill was estimated to lose $2.4 billion annually in the long run; the
Senate bill, $5.5 billion. Id.
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have produced four times as much revenue as the tax reform provisions
of the Senate bill.1 8 This ratio would have continued into the long-term
when the House tax reform provisions would have produced an annual
gain of $3.6 billion compared to a $900 million annual gain under the tax
reform measures contained in the Senate bill. 9 The Senate's action in
1969 prompted the Washington Post to comment, "E]ven the strongest
defenders of democracy are left with a hopeless feeling."'160
The Senate's record on the two most recent major tax bills does little
to commend an open rule to the House. Over 2000 tax bills are intro-
duced in each session of Congress. Many would produce dramatic
changes in social and economic policy; virtually all are technical and
complex. If each of the 435 members of the House could offer just one
amendment to major tax legislation, the result could be disastrous. Indi-
vidual Senators and Congressmen with myriad other responsibilities are
simply unable to devote sufficient time and energy to understand the
ramifications of the tax proposals considered in great depth by the com-
mittees. Nor do they have staff resources comparable to those avail-
able to the committees. The personal staffs of Senators and Congress-
men are typically not tax experts, nor are 535 Senators and Congress-
men able to call on Treasury and the Joint Committee staff for analysis
and recommendations to the same extent as the tax writing commitees.161
But to maintain that an open rule in the House would be ruinous is
not to say that the closed rule must be retained in its present form. One
alternative would be to adopt a rule that would allow individual Repre-
sentatives to move on the floor to delete provisions of the Ways and
Means Committee bill while continuing to deny them the power to add
new material. Thus, while each provision of the House bill would have
to be considered and approved in the Ways and Means Committee, pro-
visions which do not enjoy the support of a majority of the entire
House would not survive. Under this procedure, the Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee should be allowed to withdraw the bill if,
in his opinion, the floor amendments changed its essential character. One
need only hypothesize House floor action eliminating all of the tax
158The revenue estimated from the House bill during the three year period was $6.0
billion compared to $1.5 billion from the Senate bill. Id. For further comparison, the
Senate Finance Committee's version of the 1969 Act contained reforms producing ap-
proximately $250 million less than in the House bill. S. REP. No. 91-552 supra note 76,
at 16.
159 S. REP. No. 92-437, supra note 150, at 118.
160 Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1969, § A, at 24, col. 1.
161 Woodworth, supra note 29, at 408.
1438 [Vol. 58:1389
The Tax Legislative Process
reform provisions of the 1969 Act but retaining the tax relief provisions
to see the need for such discretion. Such a rule would substantially in-
crease the House members' voice in the formulation of tax legislation
without providing the potential for harm of an open rule.
Not only should consideration of the results of the Senate's open rule
of debate and amendment prompt a conviction that the practice would
be inappropriate for House consideration of tax measures, it should raise
serious questions concerning the wisdom of the Senate's adherence to its
own practice. Present Senate procedure for considering tax bills some-
times creates what can only be described as legislative anarchy-measures
occasionally burst full blown from Senators who have not given any
warning to the Finance Committee; proposals are often not related to
one another; ideas are sometimes poorly articulated on the floor. Thus,
the Senate practice affords little opportunity for careful reflection and
consideration of the wisdom or even the mechanics of the proposals-
a particularly severe shortcoming in light of the fact that most Sena-
tors generally do not call upon advisors who are as knowledgeable in
tax matters as the staffs that advise the Finance Committee. The result
of this chaos is often that the Senate version goes to a conference
committee where most of the ad hoc floor amendments are summarily
deleted.
If the entire Senate is to contribute to a tax reform effort in a sys-
tematic manner, that body must develop some procedure to assure the
orderly consideration of the issues. Perhaps the best method for ration-
alizing the Senate process would be to require individual Senators to
submit to the Finance Committee a draft of their proposals sufficiently
in advance of floor consideration of the bill to enable the committee to
study each measure and take a position on it.1 2 This process would at
least provide a method whereby the individual proposals might be sub-
jected to the collective scrutiny of the members of the Finance Com-
mittee and the staffs of the Joint Committee and the Treasury Depart-
ment. This should in turn contribute to a more thoughtful and balanced
consideration of the measures on the floor of the Senate. Even though
162 In order to accomodate for measures that are offered in response to or to coun-
terbalance other proposals, the procedure might provide for a bifurcated submission
period. After a short span of time following the close of the initial submission period,
long enough for Senators to examine the pending floor amendments and determine
whether to submit further amendments, the Finance Committee could ask for a second
round of proposed amendments. As the purpose of permitting the second round would
be to enable Senators to respond to other amendments, the second round proposals
could be made contingent on Senate adoption of the corresponding initial proposal.
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the limitations of time might prevent as thorough a consideration as the
committee proposals receive, this procedure would certainly represent
a significant advance over the disorganization of present Senate practices.
The Bill in Conference-Compromise and Conciliation
If the Senate passes the House bill without amendment, no further
congressional action is necessary and the bill goes to the President for
his signature. While this may occur with a very minor tax bill, such
unanimity is rare with more significant legislation. The Senate generally
makes numerous amendments to House measures and a conference is
,necessary to reconcile the differences. The conference is composed of
five or seven members from each house who are appointed by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. Typically, the
senior majority and minority members of the Ways and Means and
Senate Finance Committees are appointed to the conference committee.
The Senate and House conferees each vote on the issues as a unit with
a majority of each group controlling its vote. In the conference on the
1969 Act the Senate and House versions differed on over 200 important
issues. The conferees met in almost continuous session for five days
with one session lasting from ten in the morning until almost four o'clock
the following morning.
The conferees' discretion is limited to the areas of disagreement be-
tween the House and Senate bills. Where the two bills conform, there
is no room for modification. Similarly, the House and Senate bills set
the parameters within which the conference can reach agreement.
While the conference has wide latitude within these parameters, it
must appear to compromise near the middle ground between the House
,and Senate bills. For example, in 1969, the Senate raised the personal
exemption from $600 to $800 while the House retained the $600 amount
but included a general rate reduction not contained in the Senate bill.
The conference finally settled on a personal exemption of $750 and no
rate reduction.16 3
The decisions reached in conference are vital since the conference
report cannot be amended by either the House or Senate. Each house
must either approve or reject the report. Ordinarily the compromise
measure is accepted by both houses. However, if the compromise does
not sufficiently reflect congressional desires it can and will reject the
conference report. The House rejected the conference report on the
'Revenue Act of 1951 and requested a new committee. The same con-
;163 H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong, 1st Sess., at 328, 331 (1969).
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ferees were appointed, and they agreed to certain changes in the con-
ference report after which it was adopted by both houses. In the last;
session of Congress, the Senate rejected the conference compromise of
the Public Debt Limitation bill because it had sacrificed too many of the
conditions imposed by the Senate on the President's exercise of the
power to make spending cuts to keep the budget within $250 billion. "'
Rather than attempt to reach a new agreement and a more palatable
version, the committee deleted the entire presidential spending cut pro-
vision in the subsequent conference and the remainder of the bill passed
easily.
Recently the conference committee has been roundly criticized in
some quarters. The New York Times, after complimenting the Senate
for its deliberations on the 1971 Revenue Act observed that the con-
ference committee, "meeting once again in private ... chucked out just
about everything the Senate had done in committee and on the floor."' 65
The director of Ralph Nader's Tax Reform Research Group described
the conference on the 1971 Act in the following terms:
Unfortunately [the Senate] floor debate and vote are not the end of
the process. The Senate and House resolve their differences by going-
into "conference" which is where the axes are further sharpened....
These 12 [sic] powerful people are supposed to represent their re-
spective chambers; more often than not many of them represent their
personal views.160
Both the Times and Nader's group quarreled vehemently with the
decisions reached by the conferees in the 1971 Act, particularly with
the distribution of tax relief between businesses and individuals. Their
criticism seems to reflect more of a disagreement with the views of the
men who composed the committee than disapproval of the conference
process itself. Surely one cannot expect the conferees to adhere rigor-
ously to their chamber's bill. If they did, no compromise would be
forged, differences between the House and Senate bill would remain
unreconciled, and no legislation would be enacted. More importantly,
the Senate and House must not have disagreed too strongly with the
action of their conferees. Though either house could have rejected the"
conference result, the 1971 conference report passed the House by a vote
of 320 to 74 and sailed through the Senate by a 71 to 6 margin.167
104 See note 186, infra.
165 N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, at 46, col. 1.
.-166 Stanton, supra note 145, at 20.
167 117 CoNG. REc. H. 12133, S. 21109 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1971).
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In 1971, as it had in 1969, the conference acted precisely as it was
designed to act in our system of checks and balances-it worked out the
differences between the House and Senate bills. It also performed a func-
don that conferences have served with tax bills throughout the decade
-restraining the many Senate amendments which were not well con-
sidered. For example, in 1969 the conference restored to the Tax Re-
form Act over two billion dollars of annual revenue from tax reform
measures which had been diluted on the Senate floor.08
Increasing the Public Exposure to the Conference Committee
While the conference committees have performed the difficult task
of reconciliation and compromise well, certain improvements are war-
ranted. Much of the basic criticism leveled against the conference pro-
cedure, while missing the mark in the sense that it fails to consider the
realities of the congressional system, points to a need to make the ac-
tivities of the conference committee better publicized.
Presentation of Treasury's Position in Conference-The Treasury
Department generally attends the conference to state the Administra-
tion's position and to offer technical advice and assistance, and it plays
an important role in the formulation of the compromise. Although its
testimony in the public hearings before the House and Senate makes the
general Treasury position well known, the Department does not, under
present procedures, reveal the position that it takes in conference.
Treasury should make its position public in a memorandum of position
stating its views and the reasons for them.
The legislative history of the minimum tax provisions enacted in
1969169 illustrates the need for a statement of the Treasury position in
the conference. The proposal for a "limit on tax preferences" and alloca-
tion of deductions to insure that high-income individuals pay some tax
was a showpiece of the President's tax reform recommendations. 170 The
168 There have been suggestions that this action was expected by the Senators. See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1969, § 4, at 1, col. 5:
Senators who were publicly voting for the Christmas presents were privately
agreeing that things had gotten out of hand. But they reassured anyone who
raised worried questions about the financial consequences that the joint Senate-
House Conference Committee that will write the final version of the tax bill
could be trusted to reduce these fiscal gifts to manageable size.
169 INT. REv. COD OF 1954, §§ 56-58.
1 70 See Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 5048-49, 5482-88 (1969).
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House adopted the President's version with only slight modification.171
Although Treasury voiced its continuing support for the Administration
proposal in its testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, 172 that
committee considered the House provisions unduly complex and sub-
stituted a five percent minimum tax on a specified list of preferences.
The Senate Finance Committee also expanded the provision's coverage.
The President's recommended version and the House bill only reached
individuals; the Senate Finance Committee applied the minimum tax
provisions to corporations as well.'73 The Finance Committee version
was amended on the floor, principally by increasing the rate to ten per-
cent and allowing the amount of preferences to be reduced by the
amount of taxes paid as regular income tax. 4 Senator Miller, spon-
sor of the floor amendment, announced to the Senate that "the Treasury
representatives believe that my amendment is a better approach than
the one in the [Senate Finance Committee bill].' 1 75 The conference com-
mittee favored the Senate version over the House measure, and the
Senate provision was enacted into law.
Treasury never announced its position on the choice between the
House and Senate bills. It did not make public its assessment of the merits
of the structure of the Senate version or of the wisdom of extending the
coverage of the bill to encompass corporations as well as individuals.
While its views on this matter might be inferred from its initial recom-
mendations, the Treasury position in conference should be made public.
This might best be done by issuing a memorandum stating its views and
the reasons for them. Such a document would perform two important
functions. By requiring the Treasury to take and publicly defend a posi-
tion on each of the Senate amendments, it would encourage more com-
prehensive analysis of these measures. Release of such a document would
also subject the amendments made by the Senate Finance Committee
and on the Senate floor to greater public scrutiny.
Development of the Statement of the Managers-The conferees' deci-
sions are transformed into a conference report, as are bills in the execu-
tive sessions, by the staffs of the Legislative Counsel, the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation and the Treasury. Accompanying the
171 H.R. 13270, 91st Cong, 1st Sess., §5 301-302 (1969).
172See Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the Sen. Finance Comm., 91st
Cong, 1st Sess, pt. 1, at 578-84 (1969).
178 S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 76, at 113.
174 115 CoNG. REc. 38297-98 (1969) (Remarks of Senator Miller).
175 Id. at 38312.
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conference report is the "Statement of the Managers on the Part of the
Conference Committee." This statement is a rough equivalent to the com-
mittee reports of the Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees
but, unlike the committee reports, it does not explain in detail the reasons
for the conference committee's action. It merely describes each Senate
amendment and the action taken by the conferees.
In many instances the brevity of the Statement of Managers is un"
fortunate. Often the provision accepted by the conferees did not appear
in either the House or Senate bill or resulted from an amendment on the
Senate floor which was not explained in the committee reports. For
example, in 1969 the House version of the Tax Reform Act contained
a provision disallowing any deduction for interest incurred in certain
investment activities.1 76 The Senate struck this provision from its bill
177
and the conference committee adopted a provision disallowing one-half
of the amount that would have been disallowed by the House bill. Ex-
amination of the legislative history of this provision-the House bill and
the Ways and Means Committee Report, Treasury's testimony on the
House bill before the Senate Finance Committee, the Senate Finance
bill and report, the Senate bill and the conference report and Statement
of the Managers-would convince even a very sophisticated tax lawyer
that the conference simply applied the wisdom of Solomon and com-
promised between the Senate and House versions. The truth is quite
different. The conference provision is closely modelled after a measure
in the Senate bill which had addressed a similar problem in relation to
farm losses.17 8 This knowledge, coupled with study of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee report on its farm loss provision, greatly enhances
one's ability to comprehend the interest provision. Such understanding
would be far more easily obtained if a more comprehensive Statement
of the Managers were issued that discussed in some detail the provisions
which are adopted by the conference which have not been explained
by the Ways and Means or Finance Committee reports. 179
176 H.R. 13270, 91st Cong, 1st Sess. § 221 (1969).
177 S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 76, at 305.
178 See Halperin, Capital Gains and Ordinary Deductions: Negative Income Tax for
the Wealthy, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 387 (1971). See also Davenport, Farm Losses,
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: Keepin' 'Em Happy Down on the Farm, 12 B.C,
IND. & Comr. L. Rev. 319 (1971).
1179 The Joint Committee staff's action following the 1969 Tax Reform Act reflects :its
sensitivity to the dearth of legislative history. The staff published a General Explanatioi"
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, note 19, supra. The publication was not released, hoty-
ever, until December of 1970. No such publication has yet been released for the 1971
Revenue Act. Even if the staff of the Joint Committee were to institutionalize its prac-
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CONCLUSION
Congress will undoubtedly consider tax reform in 1973. Its resolution
of the issues will touch the economic well-being of our nation and may
prove vital to the continued success of our voluntary tax system. Reflec-
tion on the 1969 tax reform effort makes one suspect that the average
American taxpayer is not revolting against inequities in the tax structure;
if anything, "he is rebelling against taxes period."'180 While the Presi-
dent's tax reform proposals in 1969 would have increased revenue by
$900 million during the five subsequent years, the tax reform and relief
provisions finally passed by Congress were estimated to reduce revenues
by $20 billion over the same period. This may suggest that the only
politically viable road to reform of the present tax structure is through
tax reductions for the majority of taxpayers.' 81 Nonetheless, tax cuts
can hardly be enacted at a time when every level of government-fed-
eral, state, and local-claims a desperate need for revenue. Even if ex-
penditures are held at present levels, there will be no slack within which
to seek tax reform at the cost of diminishing federal revenue receipts.
And, if as many think, the next tax reform effort is considered in the
context of a tax increase, the political sensitivity of tax reform issues
will be aggravated. In either event, the need to convince the average
American to support vigorously a tax reform effort to make our system
simpler and more equitable when his own taxes will not thereby be re-
duced will necessarily complicate the congressional task in the coming
months.
The tax reform effort will be further complicated because it will occur
at a time when Congress' continued vitality as a modern democratic
institution is being questioned. Such fundamental issues as the relation-
ship between Congress and the President and the validity of present
methods for funding political campaigns are undergoing intensive scru-
tiny'8 2 But substantive tax changes will not await the resolution of
tice, their publication would be an inadequate substitute for an actual conference com-
mittee report. As a staff document, the publication would not be accorded the same
weight by the courts as a committee report.
180 See, Income Tax Reform as a Political Issue, Washington Post, August 29, 1972,
S A, at 18, col. 5, quoting Irving Kristol, co-editor of the Public Interest.
181 See e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1969, 5 4, at 12, col. 2:
[A]pparendy the only way to reform the tax structure of this country is to buy
off the resistance of special interests by making large over-all tax cuts. The prin-
ciple of no tax reform without over-all cuts makes little social or economic sense
but it represents political realism.
182Ralph Nader has issued a massive study of Congress, alleging that "[elvery Con-
gressional session sees a further abdication of their constitutional and de facto respon-
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these issues; the next round of tax reform may precede the next
round of congressional reform. Thus, those concerned with the tax
reform effort must focus on the narrower issues specifically relating to
the functioning of the tax legislative process.
Many proposals relating to the tax legislative process have been voiced.
For example, Ralph Nader's Tax Reform Research Group has suggested
that the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee divest
themselves of their power to select Democratic members of congres-
sional committees, alleging that this power causes "an undesirable warp-
ing of the legislative process."'18 3 But the appointive system does not
unduly "warp" the process of tax legislation. While perhaps a better pro-
cedure for selecting committee members could be found-a caucus is one
possibility-the present procedure has only a slight effect on the tax
legislative process.
The question of the scope of responsibility of the tax writing com-
mittees presents a far more vital issue. Surely the cause of tax reform
would be advanced if the Finance and the Ways and Means Committees
were able to devote more time to tax problems. The committees' need
to handle other problems of pressing national concern during the next
Congress, such as national health insurance and perhaps international
trade, will surely impair their ability to deal with tax reform issues. But
it is simply impractical to expect these committees to limit their own
jurisdictions to further the cause of tax reform.
Given the limitations of political reality, it may serve little purpose
for the coming tax reform effort to advocate reforms which hinge on
major redistributions of political power unless there has been a clear
indication that Congress is receptive. Longer-range goals of reform,
while important to the continued vitality of the democratic system, are
relatively unimportant to the coming tax reform effort. To have an
impact on that endeavor, persons must advocate measures that can be
made operative in the very near future. To that end, I have detailed a
number of suggested adjustments in the present legislative process.
sibilities. They're turning the executive branch into a White House Monarchy." Nader
Takes on Congress, Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1972 at 1, col. 5. The study includes dis-
cussion of such issues as the seniority system and the financing of political campaigns.
M. GaRuN, J. FALLows, D. ZwIcK, WHO RuNs Coctxss? (1972). Some elements of Con-
gress also feel that the institution needs revision. See C. Mathias, The Congress Is Not
Doing Its Job, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1972, at A23, col. 3. In January, Senators Mathias and
Stevenson initiated hearings to bring attention to these problems. See D. Broder, It Is
Now Time For Congress To Reform, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 1972, at C6, col. 6.188 Married Single Hearings, supra note 9, at 65.
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More and better information is the first step. The legislative hearings
can be improved by instituting prior panel discussions to educate com-
mittee members on the substantive issues they must confront. Subcom-
mittees should be delegated power to study and recommend solutions on
technical matters of limited scope. Additionally, the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation or the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee should issue a paper prior to the public hearings oudining its
tentative position on the major issues to be considered. This should
serve both to educate the Congressmen and to provide a focus for the
testimony that will follow in the public hearings. In order to maximize
the utility of the testimony at the public hearings, the committees should
require advance submission of written statements. The statements should
be summarized by the Joint Committee staff or the committee staffs and
the committees should review the summaries and invite a limited number
of witnesses to testify. Finally, the quantity and quality of testimony
on behalf of the public interest must be increased by encouraging gov-
ernment officials, academicians, bar and accounting associations, chari-
table organizations, and other public interest groups to testify.
The Treasury Department and the Joint Committee staff should ex-
plore in depth the relationship of tax provisions and related direct
expenditures and conduct ongoing studies of the existing tax system.
To facilitate studies and comparisons, Congress should redefine "adjusted
gross income," a term which presently inhibits proper analysis. Finally,
revenue estimates should be classified according to their probable ac-
curacy, and a range of figures should be provided whenever that would
serve to illustrate the accuracy and reliability of the projection.
Not only must Congress develop ways to improve the information
on which it relies to make its substantive judgments on tax questions, it
must disseminate better information to the public. Pamphlets of the Joint
Committee staff that the tax writing committees use and rely on in
executive sessions should be made public, as should the Treasury position
before the conference committee. Similarly, the managers who report
the conference committee recommendations should carefully explain the
provisions adopted by the conference that differ from the Senate Finance
or Ways and Means Committee versions which have been explained in
their reports. Some of these proposals require increasing staff manpower
which seems needed in any event; others might be modified to accom-
modate the pressing demands of time. And, if Congress continues to
wait until the close of the session to deal with the substantively complex
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issues of tax reform, implementation of some of these proposals will
probably be impossible.
The decision-making process can also be improved. In order to foster
simplicity of tax measures, the Congressmen should exercise more care
to ensure that their broad decisions can be translated into intelligible
law. This would be facilitated if the legislative staffs prepared sample
'tax forms to give the legislators a feeling of the manier in which their
broad policy decisions might be implemented as law. Additionally, the
form of debate of tax matters should be altered. The House of Repre-
sentatives should permit individual Representatives to move deletions on
the floor while allowing the Chairman of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee to withdraw bills at any time. This would guarantee that no
provision would pass the House without the support of a majority of its
members voting but would also ensure the Ways and Means Committee
enough control over its bill to preserve its essential scope and form. In the
other hall of Congress, the Senate should consider means to provide more
order to the manner in which it debates tax legislation-requiring
advance submission of proposed amendments seems the best possibility.
These proposals are scarcely revolutionary; they would change neither
the basic structure of our government nor the present system of con-
gressional powers. Moreover, these recommendations can be imple-
mented before the next tax reform effort begins. The aggregate effect
of these proposals should be significant and should contribute to our
ability to resolve the increasingly perplexing issues of tax policy. They
are a much-needed prelude to reform.
In addition to these suggestions to facilitate the upcoming tax reform
effort, there is a need to devise new mechanisms for controlling overall
fiscal policy. From its inception in 1789 until the creation of the Appro-
priations Committee in 1865, the House Ways and Means Committee
had jurisdiction over both revenues and expenditures. Formation of the
Appropriations Committee signaled an end to the unified approach over
budgetary matters and created a division of authority that has ever since
inhibited congressional ability to deal with matters of fiscal policy. 84
184 Unfortunately, congressional attempts to remedy the problem have generally been
half-hearted. In 1946 Congress established the Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget
but gave that body no binding authority over legislative appropriations. Little was ac-
complished, and Congress eliminated this committee. Recently the Joint Economic
Committee and the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Federal Expenditures have
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Concern for excessive federal spending and rising federal deficits led
the last Congress seriously to consider granting the President carte
blanche authority to keep federal spending within a $250 billion limit by
making selective cuts in spending programs .15 Although the proposalwas
ultimately defeated,8 0 it served to dramatize Congress' failure to come to
grips with this problem. The Public Debt Limitation Act'8 7 as finally
enacted contained a provision establishing a joint committee to study
possible methods to enable the Congress to exercise control over budget
totals for both outlays and receipts. Clearly no such mechanism presently
exists.'88 Spending measures are generally considered in a haphazard and
uncoordinated fashion, and no one controls the size of the complete
package. Moreover, the spending side of the budget is not correlated
with the level of anticipated federal revenues. Past attempts to control
overall budgetary policy through powers of persuasion have proven
futile; Congress needs more than a fiscal gadfly. In order to effectuate
meaningful congressional control over the budgetary process Congress
must establish a joint committee with the authority to report a bill
establishing total expenditures and revenues for the year. Congress
should receive and act on this measure early in the session and thereby
set the desired level of the federal deficit or surplus in advance of the
final consideration of the taxing and spending programs. Having estab-
lished the contours of the fiscal package, the legislators must then be
willing to set priorities within those boundaries. Only in this manner
sought to curb congressional spending. Lacking the power of legislative committees, the
too have been ineffective in shaping fiscal policy. The events of recent months indicate
that perhaps Congress is willing to seek a real solution to this problem.
385 H.R. 16810, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
180 Supported by Congressman Mills, 118 CoNG. REc. H. 9359 (daily ed. Oct. 17,
1972), the measure passed the House by a margin of 221-163. Id., H. 9402. In the Senate
the proposal met more resistance. Many Senators considered the measure to be a total
abdication of legislative responsibility and feared for the future of the domestic spending
programs that might not enjoy wholehearted Administrative support. Thus, the Senate
loaded the House version with amendments to restrict the presidential power to cut
expenditures. When the conference committee returned with some of its amendments
pared away, the Senate rejected the compromise measure by a vote of 27-39. 118
CoNG. Rrc. S. 18529 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972). Thus, the proposal to give President Nixon
the authority to make selective spending cuts died. The President is nonetheless achiev-
ing some selective spending cuts by refusing to commit some of the funds appropriated
by Congress. See Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
187 Pub. L. No. 92-599 (Oct. 27, 1972).
188 Congressional control over the federal dept is certainly not an effective means for
controlling fiscal policy. That power is exercised in response to measures already en-
acted rather than in an anticipatory manner that would shape fiscal policy.
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can the Legislative branch reintroduce the element of rationality to its
role in directing the nation's fiscal affairs.18 9
189 Obviously this would require a valliant congressional effort in order to be success-
ful. One basic purpose of the bill would be to force the other congressional committees
to shape their priorities in light of the overall budgetary figures agreed upon by Con-
gress. Accordingly, the bill would have to be reported and acted upon fairly early in
the session so that subsequent planning of taxation and spending measures could be
done rationally, Additionally, Congress might wish to establish some mechanism for
periodic reevaluation of spending and taxing measures during the session in order to
keep apprised of their progress toward attaining the required balance and to take ac-
count of significant new circumstances. Obviously these are complicated issues. These are
only some of the questions that the joint committee must grapple with over the coming
months.
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